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From the standpoint of both philosophers and psychologists, the study of moral psychology 
has undergone an affective revolution over the last three decades. This revolution has generated 
substantial interest in the role of the emotions in moral talk, thought, and behavior. Further, it has 
been claimed that some emotions are distinctively moral in nature. However, what it means for an 
emotion to count as moral and which emotions count as the moral ones are issues in need of further 
elucidation. My dissertation addresses these questions in three connected chapters, with a 
particular focus on two emotions often but obscurely referred to as “moral”: disgust and anger.  
In Chapter 1, “Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust”, I defend a novel, 
skeptical view about moral disgust. In so doing, I reject a widely-held, albeit largely implicit, 
assumption in the moral disgust literature that there exists a distinctive psychological state of moral 
disgust. To give a positive answer to what I call the ontological question about moral disgust, 
thereby vindicating its existence, I propose that a given psychological state must be shown to bear 
sufficient resemblance to the familiar, generic version of disgust, yet be distinguishable from it in 
virtue of its distinctively moral nature. I argue that existing accounts of moral disgust fail to satisfy 
these conditions. Further, I contend that we should be skeptical about the general prospect of giving 
a positive answer to the ontological question, because the empirical evidence that can be invoked 
in favor of moral disgust’s existence is too equivocal to properly distinguish (putatively) moral 
disgust from other psychological states, particularly anger.  
In Chapter 2, “What Makes an Emotion Moral?”, I develop a novel, empirically-informed 
answer to the general version of the ontological question that was raised in Chapter 1 with respect 
to moral disgust: how can we vindicate the existence of a distinctively moral emotion? I examine 
two contemporary, representative accounts of the “moral” emotions, one that type-identifies the 
moral emotions based on their effects, and another that defines the moral emotions as those that 
are constituted by specifically moral judgments. I argue that the former defines the moral emotions 
too broadly, and thus fails to draw a substantive distinction between the moral emotions and the 
non-moral ones, whereas the latter defines the moral emotions too narrowly. Informed by the 
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problems with these accounts, I introduce a motivational theory of moral emotion, which defines 
the moral emotions as those with distinctively moral action tendencies and goals.  
Finally, in Chapter 3, “In Defense of Genuinely Moral Anger”, I defend the claim that there 
is a distinctively moral subtype of anger. I argue that moral anger is a genuine form of anger that 
is differentiable from generic anger primarily in virtue of its action tendencies, which are typically 
triggered by perceived injustice and aim to satisfy two moral goals: a communicative goal, and a 
retributive goal. With this account, I offer an empirically-supported account that constitutes a 
positive answer to the ontological question about moral anger, thereby demonstrating that it is 
possible to vindicate the existence of a genuinely moral emotion while making sense of the idea 
that the moral emotions should be understood as a recognizable subset within the general class of 
the emotions.  
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Chapter 1 – Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust? 
 
1. Introduction 
Two decades ago, Leon Kass touted the “wisdom of repugnance,” citing the felt experience 
of disgust as evidence of the moral wrongness of human cloning (1997: 20). Since then, 
discussions of moral disgust have become increasingly frequent, both in the psychological and the 
philosophical literatures. Advocates of moral disgust (e.g. Miller 1997; Kass 1997; Kekes 1998; 
Kumar 2017) all defend some version of the claim that disgust has a legitimate – or proper, 
positive, important, or indispensable – role to play in moral judgment and discourse. Moral disgust 
skeptics (e.g. Kelly & Morar 2014; Bloom 2013; Kelly 2011; Nussbaum 2004), on the other hand, 
seek to deny such claims.  
How precisely to interpret the disputes that have arisen between moral disgust’s advocates, 
and its critics, is a surprisingly complex matter. As Alberto Giubilini (2016) has recently observed, 
‘moral disgust’ is a lamentably obscure term. It seems to me that there are (at least) four distinct 
questions in play in the current literature on moral disgust. First, there’s an ontological question: 
is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, 
and from other psychological states? Second, there’s a normative question about fittingness:1 is 
disgust ever fitting as a response to (some feature of) moral violations? This question about 
fittingness is best thought of as a question about correctness: When we ask whether an emotion is 
fitting, in the sense relevant to whether its object has certain features or properties, we are asking 
about whether the emotion correctly presents its object as having those features (D’Arms & 
Jacobson 2000). Third, there’s another normative question about the moral appropriateness of 
disgust: is it ever morally right to feel disgust at objects in the moral domain? It’s important to 
note that questions two and three are presented separately in an effort to avoid conflating 
fittingness and the moral appropriateness, or rightness, or permissibility, of disgust, a fallacy Justin 
                                                 
1Giubilini (2016) has recently argued that this very conceptual confusion plagues discussions of moral disgust. 
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D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000) rightly warn against.2 As they put it, that “there is a crucial 
distinction between the question of whether some emotion is the morally right way to feel, and 
whether that feeling gets it right” (2000: 66). Finally, we can distinguish a fourth question: a 
question of moral epistemology about the reliability of disgust: Does disgust reliably track morally 
relevant features or properties?  
What does not seem to be at issue in debates between moral disgust advocates and skeptics, 
at least not by the lights of the scholars involved, is the first, ontological question. The idea that 
there is such a thing as a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust has mostly been implicitly 
assumed, but not explicitly argued for in the moral disgust literature. I find this surprising, not least 
because proper interpretation and investigation of the other questions may depend on our having 
properly identified the psychological state we’re talking about (or not talking about) when we try 
to answer them. In this chapter, I investigate the previously neglected ontological question. I 
defend the novel skeptical view that we have strong reason to doubt there is such a thing as 
genuinely moral disgust.  
First, though, let me briefly explain why the position I am defending in this chapter is 
different from existing forms of skepticism about moral disgust. The ontological skepticism I am 
advancing is distinct from the two most prominent skeptical accounts in the moral disgust 
literature, which are defended by Daniel Kelly (2011) and Martha Nussbaum (2004). Though, like 
me, Kelly and Nussbaum argue in favor of versions of general skepticism about moral disgust, 
they are primarily concerned with questions other than the ontological question. Kelly, a self-
avowed “disgust skeptic” argues that, given what we know about generic disgust’s evolutionary 
story and its functional role, there is no good reason to think that disgust is a reliable guide to the 
moral status of its elicitors, because generic disgust is designed to be hypersensitive and will thus 
lead to too many false positives (2011: 139). In short, Kelly is skeptical about the fourth question 
I identified above: the question of moral epistemology. Nussbaum (2004), on the other hand, 
argues that disgust has no place in the moral domain because it leads to harmful consequences 
overall. More specifically, the effects of disgust on people’s thought and behavior bring harm to 
members of disadvantaged and marginalized groups who are treated as objects of disgust. So, 
Nussbaum is a skeptic about the third question listed above: i.e. she thinks it is never morally 
                                                 
2 To give a recent example, Plakias (2017) defends an account of moral disgust that provides a positive answer to the 
question about fittingness, where the emotional response in question is generic disgust.  
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appropriate to feel disgust in the moral domain. Though it’s true that Kelly and Nussbaum may 
well agree with my negative answer to the ontological question and accept that there is no such 
thing as genuinely moral disgust, it is worth taking note at the outset of the differences in each of 
our skeptical targets. Arguing that there is no such thing as genuinely moral disgust, as I shall do 
in the present chapter, is importantly different from arguing that disgust is unreliable, or that it is 
not morally appropriate.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I put forward two conditions that any 
account of genuinely moral disgust must satisfy. In section 3, I apply these conditions to two 
prominent accounts of moral disgust – by John Kekes and Victor Kumar – and argue that neither 
succeeds in vindicating the existence of genuinely moral disgust. Informed by the specific 
problems found in Kekes’ and Kumar’s accounts of moral disgust, I conclude by discussing why 
we ought to be skeptical about the general prospect of providing a positive answer to the 
ontological question about moral disgust.  
 
2. What is genuinely moral disgust? 
The ontological question at issue in this chapter is whether there is a distinctive psychological 
state of moral disgust. I propose that if a given emotional response is to count as genuinely moral 
disgust, it must satisfy the following conditions, which are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient: 
1. It must be a genuine form of disgust.   
2. It must be genuinely moral. 
In the next two subsections, I spell out these conditions in more detail.  
 
2.1 Interlude: Some assumptions about emotions  
It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to comprehensively defend a specific theory 
of what emotions are.3 However, a few words are in order about the theoretical assumptions I am 
making in this chapter. I assume, following a number of emotion theorists, including Nico Frijda 
(1986; 2007), Andrea Scarantino (2014), and Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson (forthcoming), 
                                                 
3 I will spell out my preferred theory of emotion in more detail in chapter 2.  
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that emotions4 are best understood as syndromes of thought (where these thoughts are 
characteristic rather than constitutive), feeling, and motivation. The motivational component is 
particularly important when it comes to characterizing and distinguishing emotions. The 
motivational role includes a distinctive set of action tendencies, a goal that constitutes satisfaction 
of the emotion, and the focusing of attention on the emotional goal. This means that emotions tend 
to seek precedence over and control behavior, thought, and experience. 
I also assume, uncontroversially, that emotions are elicited by and directed at objects 
(which can include actions, agents, states of affairs, thoughts, etc.), and carry with them some kind 
of representational content about their elicitors. For example, sadness typically represents its 
elicitor as involving a loss. It cannot be assumed that a particular object will necessarily or 
universally elicit a given emotion – e.g. a tarantula might inspire fear in me today, but not 
tomorrow; it might frighten you every time you see it, but never scare your mother; it might inspire 
eager anticipation or hunger instead of fear in your Cambodian friend who grew up regarding 
tarantulas as a delicious delicacy. So, elicitors may vary across people and cultures, for a variety 
of reasons. Still, it is fair to say that emotions have paradigm elicitors; that is, objects that typically 
elicit the relevant emotional response in most people. It is also fair to say that if two people perceive 
a given object in the same way (e.g. as fearsome, angersome, or sad, etc.), then we should expect 
to see them both in the grip of the same emotional syndrome.    
 
2.2 What counts as a genuine form of disgust? 
To meet condition (1), a given emotional response must be shown to be a genuine form of 
disgust. More specifically, it must be a subspecies of the psychological kind that is generic disgust.5 
This means that the emotional response in question must be sufficiently similar to generic disgust 
in terms of (some of) its characteristic features, such as its characteristic thought, phenomenology, 
its motivational and behavioral profile, and perhaps also its pattern of neural activation. 
                                                 
4 D’Arms & Jacobson (forthcoming; see also D’Arms & Jacobson 2003) restrict their focus to a class of emotions that 
they term the natural emotions, or “paradigmatic emotion kinds.” The class of natural emotion kinds includes, but is 
not limited to, anger, contempt, disgust, envy, fear, joy, pride, shame, and sadness. It is worth noting that D’Arms & 
Jacobson’s list of the natural emotions closely resembles the lists of “basic,” universal, or pan-cultural emotions put 
forward by various psychologists “with disparate theoretical approaches,” including Paul Ekman, Richard Lazarus, 
and J. Tooby & L. Cosmides (D’Arms & Jacobson 2003: 138, and n. 23 on the same page). 
5 What I’m calling generic disgust in this chapter is also often referred to as “physical disgust,” “bodily disgust,” 
“pathogen disgust,” or “core disgust” in the philosophy and psychology literatures.  
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So, what is the nature of generic disgust? Disgust is a negatively-valenced emotion that is 
thought to have originated in distaste for bitter, possibly toxic foods in order to protect us from 
pathogens and infections. Ekman & Friesen (1971) identified disgust as one of six basic, universal 
emotions with a characteristic facial expression that is recognized across cultures. Disgust’s telltale 
facial expression is characterized by wrinkling of the nose, and retraction of the upper lip. The lips 
may be closed, to prevent the offensive object from entering the mouth, or the lips and mouth may 
be open (“gaping”). The gape face may be accompanied by extrusion of the tongue and vocal 
sounds. Disgust also induces a subjective experience of revulsion, which may involve feelings of 
nausea, sweating, and shivering. The action tendencies typical of disgust are withdrawal or 
avoidance behaviors; the gape face, for instance, is a reaction that prevents ingestion of and 
encourages oral expulsion of suspect, possibly contaminated, substances. Disgust involves a sense 
of (perceived) threat of contamination, and motivates us to withdraw from, and possibly contain 
the spread of, that contamination.  
Given disgust’s evolutionary function to protect us from contamination it is unsurprising 
that the paradigm elicitors of disgust are objects that present possible threats of disease or infection, 
such as decaying or rotten foods, body products (e.g. blood, feces, vomit, viscera), body envelope 
violations, and certain sexual practices (e.g. incest, bestiality). However, as D’Arms & Jacobson 
(2014) argue, it is also possible, and fitting, for stimuli to elicit disgust simply in virtue of how 
they look, taste, smell, or feel, even when they do not present any threat of contamination. Fudge 
shaped to look like feces is perfectly germ-free, but it nevertheless disgusting – and is subsequently 
avoided rather than eaten – in virtue of its visual similarity to feces.  For similar reasons, we should 
not be at all surprised that hygienic stimuli such as vomit-shaped rubber molds, well-embalmed 
corpses, or non-toxic slime elicit disgust, and that people are thereby averse to those stimuli. The 
main point here is that many objects that are not contaminating may still merit disgust in virtue of 
their perceptual properties (D’Arms & Jacobson 2014: 273-74). 
With all of this in mind, we now know how to establish whether some emotional response 
is a genuine subtype of generic disgust. We should expect the emotional response to share 
similarities with generic disgust when it comes to its phenomenology (e.g. a feeling of revulsion, 
and corresponding physiological signs), facial expression (e.g. the disgust face, with a wrinkled 
nose, curled lip, and possibly gaping mouth), and characteristic action tendencies in response to 
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its elicitors (e.g. avoidance and aversion, and possibly a tendency to describe the elicitor using 
disgust language).  
 
2.3 What counts as genuinely moral? 
Condition (2) requires that, for a given emotional response to count as a form of genuinely 
moral disgust, it must be, unsurprisingly, genuinely moral. But determining whether a given 
emotional emotion is an instance of genuinely moral disgust requires us to confront a difficult 
problem: how to delineate the boundaries of the moral domain. As Daniel Kelly notes, the term 
“moral disgust” at least suggests that the domain of morality can be demarcated clearly, and that 
“disgust [of some kind] sometimes operates comfortably within its purview” (2011: 126). Yet, 
given the lack of consensus about how to properly determine what belongs in the moral domain, 
Kelly concludes, “there is not yet any account of how to precisely demarcate the domain of 
morality, so there is not yet any way to separate out instances of genuinely moral disgust from 
others” (128, emphasis in original).   
I agree with Kelly that we don’t yet have a good account of how, precisely, to delineate the 
boundaries of the moral domain such that we can clearly distinguish between instances of 
genuinely moral disgust and non-moral generic disgust in every case. However, granting this much 
does not require us to accept the second part of Kelly’s claim: that we can’t make any distinctions 
between instances of genuinely moral disgust and non-moral generic disgust. In this section, I 
attempt to provide some criteria by which we can do just that.   
To satisfy condition (2), I propose that instances of genuinely moral disgust must be 
demonstrably differentiable from generic disgust in (at least) the following ways. First, the two 
kinds of disgust will have different concrete elicitors (i.e. they will be directed at different 
particular objects). We already know that generic disgust is typically elicited by non-moral stimuli. 
By contrast, we should expect moral disgust to be typically elicited by distinctively moral stimuli, 
i.e. some moral violations with certain morally relevant features. Of course, it isn’t enough just to 
stipulate that genuinely moral disgust is genuinely moral in virtue of its being elicited by moral 
stimuli. After all, generic disgust could well be elicited by moral objects, too. With this in mind, I 
take this condition to require evidence that moral disgust appropriately responds to some particular 
subset of moral violations as such. That is, the emotional response must properly respond to the 
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morally relevant properties6 in virtue of which the moral violations are wrong by the lights of the 
agent. To successfully meet this condition, the moral disgust advocate will need to provide a story 
about why their version of (putatively) moral disgust is well-suited to responding to the relevant 
moral properties. 
We should also try to differentiate moral disgust from generic disgust by looking at their 
respective goals, functional roles and corresponding action tendencies.7 Generic disgust’s 
functional role is non-moral: its role is to motivate the avoidance of things that represent a threat 
of infection. The goal of generic disgust is to ensure that one stays free of contamination, so 
avoidance of the possible contaminant may also be accompanied by cleansing or de-contamination 
behaviors. By contrast, the functional role of moral disgust is, plausibly, to motivate the avoidance 
of or aversion to particular kinds of moral violations as well as the agents who perpetrate those 
wrongful actions. Given the nature and function of generic disgust, if there is such a thing as moral 
disgust, it would be reasonable to think that its goal is to avoid and stop the spread of moral 
contamination. Moral disgust’s goal will thus be associated with action tendencies that make it 
more likely that agents will morally evaluate the violation and the perpetrator. Perhaps moral 
disgust will also give rise to thoughts about moral contamination, and motivate distinctively moral 
kinds of de-contamination behaviors.8  
Drawing these contrasts between the generic and moral versions of disgust requires that 
the boundaries between the moral and the non-moral can be clearly demarcated, which, as I noted 
above, is no easy task. It bears saying that, in the literature, philosophers mostly proceed on the 
assumption that there is a solution to this problem rather than offering novel solutions of their own. 
If anyone must bear the burden of explaining what counts as moral, I suggest that it is defenders 
of moral disgust, who (explicitly or implicitly) posit the existence of a new, distinctively moral 
emotion. This burden-shifting move notwithstanding, for current purposes we’re in need of a 
working account of what characterizes some violations as genuinely moral. To that end, I will 
borrow from the literature regarding the moral/conventional distinction, which attempts to identify 
particular properties that mark certain violations as genuinely moral, as opposed to merely 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, these properties won’t themselves be moral – rather, they will be non-moral properties on which 
moral properties supervene, such as harm, loss of property without consent, failure to cooperate, and so on. For the 
sake of expedience, in what follows I will refer to these properties on which moral properties supervene as moral.  
7 I develop this method of type-identifying moral emotions in greater detail in chapter 2. 
8 Kumar (2017: 17) suggests something along these lines when he raises the possibility that someone who is morally 
disgusted by her own actions may be motivated to reform her behavior to “cleanse” herself. 
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conventional.9 If our commonsense judgment agrees that the properties picked out by the 
moral/conventional literature are good candidates for the distinctively-moral-job, then that should 
suffice for now.  
Here’s what the moral/conventional literature tells us: Moral violations are defined by their 
consequences for the rights and welfare of others and typically involve harm being done to a victim 
(e.g. hitting someone or pulling their hair). On the other hand, conventional violations are defined 
as violations of the behavioral norms that typically operate within social systems (e.g. chewing 
gum at school). Unlike moral transgressions, the wrongness of conventional violations is 
considered authority-dependent (i.e. it is only bad to chew gum at school because the teacher says 
so). It is commonly thought that the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is basic to 
moral competence. The ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is present in children as 
young as 39 months of age in a variety of cultures, and involves recognizing that moral wrongs 
are more serious than conventional wrongs (Turiel 1983; Smetana 1993; Blair et al. 1995; Nichols 
2004). Participants who competently make the distinction characteristically make justifications for 
why moral transgressions are wrong with reference to harm done to the victim. Subjects also judge 
moral transgressions to be impermissible even if there is no rule prohibiting the action, whereas 
the permissibility of conventional violations is thought to be rule-dependent.  
With these considerations from the moral/conventional literature in mind, here are some 
(overlapping) things we can say about the genuinely moral nature of moral violations. First, harm 
is morally relevant. Many moral violations are characteristically wrong in virtue of the harm such 
violations inflict on victims. Second, certain moral violations are wrong in virtue of their 
infringement upon the rights of victims. Third, the wrongness of moral violations is authority-
independent.10  
To sum up, the second proposed condition requires that a given emotional response must 
be shown to be genuinely moral, in the following ways. Moral disgust must have a distinctive 
                                                 
9 Most philosophers think that a minimal, necessary condition of the moral is that it can be distinguished from the 
conventional. It’s worth mentioning an alternative account here in order to set it aside: Jonathan Haidt (2012) has a 
view according to which purity norms are moral norms. Purity norms involve food and bodily objects, and the violation 
of purity norms typically elicits generic disgust. Thus, on this view, all disgust just is moral disgust. However, what 
Haidt is doing in his wide (arguably merely descriptive) circumscription of morality is not what philosophers take 
themselves to be doing: we have in mind something narrower. So, I take myself to be justified in insisting on a 
distinction between the moral and the merely conventional, and on a distinction between generic disgust and moral 
disgust – if there is such a thing as genuinely moral disgust.  
10 Strictly speaking, this last point directs us to a property that is not morally relevant; i.e. moral violations are not 
wrong solely in virtue of their being a breach of authority. 
 9 
moral functional role and it must motivate distinctively moral action tendencies. Further, it must 
demonstrably and appropriately respond to (some of) the morally relevant properties of the moral 
violations it is elicited by. As I noted above, providing a comprehensive account of what 
characterizes the genuinely moral domain is a mammoth job. However, I deny that I must fully 
shoulder that burden, and I am hopeful that I have said enough about how to distinguish the moral 
from the non-moral to proceed.11  
  
3. Assessing the candidates 
Now that we’ve established the conditions that must be met for some emotional response 
to qualify as genuinely moral disgust, let’s apply them to two existing accounts of moral disgust 
by John Kekes and Victor Kumar. It will be seen that both accounts fall afoul of the conditions, 
but in different ways: Kekes’ view fails to meet condition (2) – there is insufficient evidence that 
the disgust response he examines is genuinely moral. Contrastingly, Kumar’s view cannot satisfy 
condition (1) – we have reason to doubt that he has identified an emotional response that’s best 
described as a genuine form of disgust. I’ll examine these accounts in turn, beginning with Kekes’. 
 
3.1 Kekes’ account of moral disgust 
According to John Kekes, moral disgust is a “reasonable reaction” to moral violations that 
are performed in a “gross, flamboyant, flagrant and contemptuous manner” (1998: 105). Like 
generic disgust, moral disgust is an emotion that is elicited by revolting stimuli (101).  Although 
generic disgust “is often a matter of taste” when it comes to things like food, smells, insects, sexual 
practices and jokes, certain experiences of disgust are so “profound” and “instinctive” that they 
would be uniformly experienced by anyone confronted with the relevant elicitors. For Kekes, it is 
these experiences of disgust that we should call “moral disgust” (102). Implicit in this discussion 
is the idea that moral disgust is differentiable from run-of-the-mill generic disgust, so it is 
                                                 
11 I am also happy to accept that the moral violations Kumar and Kekes are talking about in their accounts of moral 
disgust are genuinely moral violations, even though we may not have landed on a comprehensive account of what, 
precisely, makes them moral violations as opposed to some other sort of norm violation. Kekes (1998: 107), for one, 
explicitly accepts that we should make a distinction between violations of moral norms – what he calls “required 
conventions” – and non-moral conventions.  
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reasonable to interpret Kekes as offering a positive answer to the ontological question about the 
existence of genuinely moral disgust.    
To explain what he takes moral disgust to be, Kekes writes, 
What makes some experiences of disgust moral is the combination of two elements. 
One element is the grievous and unjustified harm inflicted on a human being. The 
other is that it is done in a manner that outrages the sensibility of morally committed 
witnesses (102-103, emphasis added). 
We can interpret this as a story about what makes Kekes’ moral disgust genuinely moral. In other 
words, we could think of the above two elements – the harm, and the “outrageous” (or gross, 
flamboyant, etc.) manner in which the action is performed – as candidates for the morally relevant 
properties that moral disgust is the proper response to.  
To see whether Kekes’ account meets my proposed conditions, it will be helpful to consider 
some specific moral violations that Kekes takes to be morally disgusting. The examples include 
“slowly disemboweling a person, dismembering someone with a chainsaw, slaughtering babies 
and bathing in their blood, or being drowned in excrement” (101). One important thing to note is 
that all of these examples are, quite obviously, extremely physically disgusting. A large volume of 
blood, guts, gore, dead bodies, and feces are all clearly within the purview of generic disgust. The 
examples also include the morally relevant property of harm, and they do seem to be performed in 
an outrageous (etc.) fashion. However, it seems as though what makes each violation outrageous, 
gross, flagrant, etc. just is what’s physically disgusting about it; the generous amount of blood, 
guts, or feces involved, say. So it’s not clear from these examples that what Kekes is calling moral 
disgust is being elicited by the distinctively moral properties of the wrongful actions rather than 
by the sheer volume of generically disgusting stimuli. In other words, we can’t yet say that the 
emotional response under discussion is a distinctively moral subtype of generic disgust. So, 
condition (2) hasn’t been satisfied.  
Unfortunately, no further clarity is forthcoming. Kekes provides some further examples in 
order to compare morally disgusting violations with other acts that are also wrong, but not 
disgusting. For example, shooting people dead in order to take their money is morally wrong but 
not morally disgusting. The same applies to torturing captured enemy soldiers by depriving them 
of sleep and food. By comparison, disemboweling children and “[watching] them writhe as they 
die” is both wrong and morally disgusting, as is mutilating someone by “cutting off their limbs 
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inch by inch with a chain saw” (105-106). All of these examples include grievous harm, yet only 
the latter two are morally disgusting, so harm cannot be the morally relevant property. 
What about the other candidate property i.e., the “outrageous” (or gross, etc.) manner in 
which the action is performed? Perhaps what this means is that the morally disgusting examples, 
but not the examples of merely wrong acts, are performed in a way that expresses a particularly 
objectionable attitude that is especially cruel, evil, or callous. Though this does seem like a 
genuinely moral way of spelling out Kekes’ second element, the worry is that it doesn’t properly 
distinguish the morally disgusting cases from the other examples. Plausibly, torturing people by 
depriving them of sleep and food also expresses extreme callousness and cruelty. I think, to echo 
a point made above, that the gross flamboyance, flagrance, etc. that supposedly characterizes the 
morally disgusting examples is, in fact, best explained by the presence of (non-moral) generically 
disgusting elicitors. This means, then, that Kekes’ account does not meet condition (2), and thus 
does not qualify as a form of genuinely moral disgust. What Kekes has given us is a set of moral 
violations that also happen to be very non-morally disgusting. But the compresence of moral 
violations and generic disgust does not suffice to make that disgust genuinely moral. 
On a more conciliatory note, although I have argued that Kekes’ discussion does not 
successfully establish the existence of genuinely moral disgust, I think it does point us towards 
some other, important moral category that applies to acts and agents. The actions that Kekes 
classifies as morally disgusting “threaten the possibility of civilized life” (106).  Not only that, 
Kekes describes the agents who perform morally disgusting acts as “not merely wicked, but 
depraved” (my emphasis).  I suggest that we should understand ‘morally disgusting,’ as Kekes 
conceives of it, as a term that applies to and describes actions and agents that belong in the class 
of the depraved, 12 instead of taking it as evidence of a distinctively moral subtype of disgust that 
is elicited by that category. When we use the term ‘morally disgusting’ in Kekes’ sense, we are 
recognizing acts and/or agents that exhibit depravity, and expressing our moral condemnation of 
those acts and/or agents. Of course, much more needs to be said to spell out this picture, but in 
sum, the point I wish to make here is that we should take Kekes’ account to be telling us something 
interesting about the moral category of the depraved. But we should not infer from his account that 
                                                 
12 Cf. Luke Russell’s (2014) discussion of the use of ‘evil’ as a secular concept. Kekes (1998: 106) states that “moral 
disgust is the secular equivalent of sacrilege.”  
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he is justified in positing the existence of a distinctively moral kind of disgust. In the next 
subsection, we’ll see how Kumar’s account of moral disgust fares. 
 
3.2 Kumar’s account of moral disgust 
Recently, Victor Kumar (2017) has advanced a compelling account of genuinely moral 
disgust. Kumar builds upon what we know about the characteristic features and evolutionary story 
of generic disgust to develop an account of moral disgust. Kumar holds that just as generic disgust 
tracks the threat of microbial contamination, moral disgust tracks moral contamination.13 Moral 
disgust is thus a genuinely moral response to particular moral violations because it accurately 
reflects, and tracks, the nature of those wrongs. 
Before I discuss Kumar’s view in more detail, it’s worth flagging a possible source of 
confusion, and defusing an objection that may stem from it. Kumar introduces his central claim in 
this way: 
I will explain how moral disgust can be a fitting moral attitude. Disgust is fitting 
when it is evoked by moral wrongs that pollute social relationships by eroding 
shared expectations of trust (1). 
As we saw earlier, the ontological question of whether there is in fact such a thing as genuinely 
moral disgust needs to be distinguished from the question of whether generic disgust can be a 
fitting response to moral violations. If Kumar’s view is best understood as an account of when 
generic disgust is fitting as a response to certain moral violations, and he is not in fact arguing for 
a positive answer to the ontological question, then my criticisms here are unfounded. 
However, it is perfectly reasonable to interpret Kumar as arguing in favor of the ontological 
claim when we consider this excerpt: 
Moral disgust plays a causal role in our psychology that is similar to pathogen 
disgust, but it exhibits several differences. Most obviously, disgust has become 
                                                 
13 It’s worth noticing that Kumar’s view quite closely resembles Plakias’ account of moral disgust (2013; 2017), 
though Kumar’s account is unique in its discussion of disgust’s polluting aspect as involving subversion of trust. 
Plakias (2013) argues that “moral” disgust – she uses the term descriptively – tracks social contagion in much the 
same way that physical disgust tracks physical contagion. In her 2017 paper, Plakias develops this view further to 
argue for the response model of disgust, according to which disgust is a fitting response to norm violations insofar as 
norm violations are potentially contagious.  
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attuned to new abstract cues: norm violations… More importantly, moral disgust 
motivates distancing that is social as well as physical (4). 
It’s clear from this passage that Kumar takes moral disgust to be a different kind of psychological 
state from generic (pathogen) disgust. So, I am on solid ground in taking him to be positing the 
existence of a distinctively moral subtype of disgust. This holds, even if – perhaps even especially 
if – it turns out that Kumar, like others in the moral disgust debate, has failed to clearly distinguish 
the ontological question from the separate normative question about whether generic disgust is 
ever a fitting response to certain moral violations.  
According to Kumar, moral disgust is elicited by the class of moral violations that he calls 
“reciprocity violations” (12).14 Reciprocity violations include instances of cheating (being treated 
unfairly, line-cutting); dishonesty (hypocrisy, betrayal, disloyalty, lying); and exploitation (fraud, 
embezzlement, taking advantage). Kumar does not explicitly define reciprocity violations; rather, 
he takes the class of wrongs that contains cheating, dishonesty, and exploitation to have enough of 
a family resemblance to warrant a common label. Kumar distinguishes reciprocity violations from 
“violations of norms related to harm, theft, autonomy, or special obligations” (9). Whereas 
reciprocity violations typically elicit disgust, these other kinds of moral violations usually elicit 
moral anger.  
To support the claim that reciprocity violations (as Kumar understands them) elicit moral 
disgust, Kumar cites self-report data from various studies (e.g. Hutcherson & Gross 2011; Rozin 
et al. 1999; Nabi 2002; Tybur et al. 2009, discussed in Kumar 2017: 12) that shows that people 
affirm experiencing disgust in response to a wide range of moral violations actions like embezzling 
money from a bank and stealing from the blind. Additionally, Kumar points to research that does 
not rely on self-report measures that suggests that reciprocity violations in economic games15 elicit 
responses that are characteristic of generic disgust. For example, participants who receive low ball 
offers in the ultimatum game make the disgust (gape) face (Cannon et al. 2011), select the gape 
                                                 
14 Kumar notes that moral disgust is also elicited by in-group and purity violations, but he focuses primarily on moral 
disgust as a fitting response to reciprocity violations – reciprocity violations, unlike purity violations, are a purer kind 
of example, since they are not physically disgusting. I follow him in this regard.  
15 The economic games Kumar discussed are the ultimatum game and the public goods game. The ultimatum game is 
a two-player game in which the first player is given a sum of money and instructed to offer some portion of it, however 
small, to the other player, who decides to either accept or reject the proposal. If they reject the proposal, neither player 
receives any money. In a public goods game, multiple players contribute money to a pot that is then multiplied and 
redistributed among all the players. Though it is in everyone’s best interests, collectively, to contribute all their money 
to the common pot, players may still defect by choosing not to contribute their fair share to the pot and benefitting 
from others’ contributions to the pot when the money is redistributed.  
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face as the expression that befits their experience (see Chapman et al. 2013 for a review), and 
exhibit increased activity in the anterior insula, an area of the brain correlated with disgust (Sanfey 
et al. 2003). People who receive low ball offers in the ultimatum game typically reject those offers 
because they expected a fair(er) distribution of the money, and thus perceive that they have been 
cheated (Kumar 2017: 12). 
Kumar argues that the distinctive feature of reciprocity violations that makes moral disgust 
particularly well-suited as a response to them is that they tend to pollute and contaminate (Kumar 
also uses the term “circulate”). People who commit reciprocity violations subvert shared 
expectations of trust in benign social interactions, thereby “spoiling these interactions” (13). 
Reciprocity violations are contaminating in the sense that once they have been committed, other 
people are more likely to start cheating or acting dishonestly too – i.e. such violations tend to 
spread, or circulate. Kumar explains that although we are intrinsically motivated to refrain from 
harming others, people typically follow norms that prohibit cheating and dishonesty only 
conditionally, i.e. so long as others follow them, too (14).  
The key piece of evidence Kumar cites to support the claim that reciprocity failures are 
contaminating is the observation that defection – that is, free-riding by hoarding one’s own money 
rather than contributing to the shared pot – in public goods games tends to spread rapidly across 
the pool of participants (Fischbacher et al. 2001; discussed in Kumar 2017: 14-15.).1617 
Importantly, the distinctive polluting and contaminating features of reciprocity violations help 
explain the kind of punishment that is motivated by moral disgust. Unlike more direct forms of 
punishment such as blame and confrontation, which are more likely to be motivated by anger, 
disgust motivates an avoidance action tendency: physical withdrawal from and social exclusion of 
the wrongdoer (Kumar 2017: 13-14). Kumar argues that such punishment (which is collectively 
meted out in cases where third parties are disgusted by reciprocity violators) is an appropriate 
response to wrongdoers whose “actions tend to pollute and spoil otherwise benign or positive 
social interaction” (14). The punishment’s purpose is to deprive the wrongdoer of social contact 
                                                 
16 Kumar doesn’t explicitly discuss evidence about how participants in public goods games respond to free riders 
when the moral threat of defection hasn’t already spread through the group. But plausibly, on his view people will 
still be disgusted by defectors and motivated to socially exclude them in order to punish them. 
17 We might also consider this alternative explanation of the cases where defection has already spread throughout the 
group: people respond to growing defection by hoarding their money, too, not primarily because defection is itself 
polluting, but because they just want to salvage what they can of their own pot of money once it becomes clear that 
everyone else is defecting. 
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and continued access to shared resources, and to contain the spread of reciprocity failure so that 
the wrongdoer’s bad behavior won’t “infect” others. On this view, we should interpret participants’ 
behavior in economic games, such as rejection of low ball offers in ultimatum games and second 
or third party punishment of defectors in public goods games (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004), as 
motivated by disgust. I will return to – and dispute – this point below.  
At this point, let’s examine whether Kumar’s account satisfies the first condition. To satisfy 
condition (1), Kumar must show that what he is calling moral disgust is a genuine subtype of 
generic disgust. Here he seems, at least initially, to be on safe ground: in light of the evidence he 
cites, the emotional response Kumar is describing appears to be sufficiently similar to generic 
disgust when it comes to its characteristic facial expression, brain activation, as well as its 
behavioral and motivational profile (e.g. the avoidance action tendency, self-reported feelings of 
disgust). As a quick look at condition (2), Kumar’s account of moral disgust successfully 
differentiates it from generic disgust when it comes to its elicitors and its functional role. Generic 
disgust is not a punishing attitude, and so punishment does not show up in its functional role. By 
contrast, the functional role of Kumar’s moral disgust – to motivate avoidance behavior in order 
to stop the contaminating spread of reciprocity failures – does explain why the avoidance action 
tendency may take the form of punishment. 
Here, though, I want to challenge an assumption present in Kumar’s account: that moral 
violations can be cleanly classified as a certain kind of violation or another. It’s not clear that the 
kinds of wrongs Kumar has in mind are obviously distinct from harm or autonomy violations. 
Indeed, you might think that the violation of expectations of reciprocity is what constitutes harm 
in some cases. For example, consider the case of spousal infidelity. Cheating, understood in this 
sense, is a paradigm example of dishonesty and a violation of special obligations to one’s partner. 
It’s very plausible to say that people who have been the victims of such cheating experience it as 
harmful, largely in virtue of the betrayal of trust that cheating involves.    
What about the cheating that takes place in economic games, which Kumar takes to be a 
paradigm elicitor of moral disgust? Consider this claim from Shaun Nichols and Jesse Prinz:  
When people fail to cooperate or take more than is just for themselves, they treat 
others as inferior or less deserving. In our society, where presumptions of equality 
are strongly emphasized, that is seen as a harm (Prinz & Nichols 2010: 130). 
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Prinz and Nichols say that this observation rings particularly true when it comes to cases of free 
riding: acts of free riding are harms, and are perceived as such, because the victims are taken 
advantage of. If this is right, then we should question Kumar’s classification of the particular 
wrongs he labels reciprocity violations as distinct from harm violations, autonomy violations, and 
violations of special obligations. This is important, because, by Kumar’s own lights, violations 
that involve harm are more likely to elicit anger, not disgust.18  
We now have reason to doubt that the kinds of wrongs that Kumar dubs reciprocity 
violations are distinct from harm violations. This raises the possibility that anger, not disgust, is 
the primary emotional response to reciprocity violations precisely because the victims of such 
violations take themselves to have experienced a harm.19 In what follows, I seek defend this claim 
in order to show that Kumar’s account fails to satisfy condition (1). To do so, I need to more closely 
examine the relevant empirical evidence to make the case that anger, not disgust, is the primary 
emotional response to reciprocity violations. This is the task I turn to in the next section. 
 
3.3 Disgust versus anger: What does the evidence show?  
In this section, I examine the empirical evidence Kumar relies on to argue that disgust is 
elicited in response to reciprocity violations. Recall that Kumar points to self-report data (i.e. 
people say they are “disgusted” by reciprocity violations), evidence about the facial expressions 
people make in response to or associate with reciprocity violations, and data about the brain 
activity of victims of reciprocity violations. In what follows, I briefly consider each set of evidence 
in turn and argue that it fails to clearly establish the presence of disgust rather than anger. In the 
following section, I argue that the punishing behavior seen in economic games is better explained 
by anger than by disgust.  
 
Disgust language  
                                                 
18 Kumar has a narrower reading of harm in mind, where harm means inflicting physical (as opposed to psychological, 
emotional, financial, etc.) injury on a victim. However, this narrow interpretation of harm strikes me as an artificial, 
and not especially useful, category. People’s interests are not so narrowly tied to physical injury; everyone would 
prefer to experience a small physical harm, like a paper cut, than a large emotional harm, such as being betrayed or 
taken advantage of.   
19 Kumar does acknowledge that reciprocity violations in the context of economic games like the ultimatum game, 
and public goods games, sometimes elicit anger as well as disgust, though he does say anger is elicited to “a lesser 
degree” than disgust (Kumar 2017: 9). But, as I will argue, this concession does not do justice to the evidence.   
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People often employ disgust terminology when talking about moral violations. This isn’t 
just a quirk of English; the heavily moralized use of disgust language is seen in numerous 
languages (Haidt et al. 1997; Rozin et al. 1999; cf. Royzman & Sabini 2001) and has been taken 
by some (e.g. Rozin et al. 1999) as evidence of the existence of a distinctively socio-moral form 
of disgust. However, when people describe moral violations as “disgusting” or use the term 
“disgust” to refer to their emotional response to those violations, we are not licensed in inferring 
– as Kumar does – that they are literally disgusted.  
It has been argued that disgust language is used metaphorically when talking about (non-
generically disgusting) moral violations (Bloom 2005; Royzman & Sabini 2001). Consider, for 
instance, this claim from Royzman & Sabini: 
The common usage of the word “disgust” in moral contexts should not seduce us 
into believing that, in the cases like these, the feelings on the response-side are 
anything like the feelings one is surely plunged into through an encounter with 
feces, slime, and severed limbs (2001: 53, my emphasis). 
As I argued when spelling out the conditions for genuinely moral disgust above, we should 
not expect the feelings – and, I would add, behavioral responses, including the tendency to use 
disgust language to describe moral violations and one’s own response to them – characteristic of 
(putative) moral disgust to be identical to the responses that characterize generic disgust. We 
should, however, expect that people who use disgust language in response to moral violations are 
having a genuine disgust response if their language is to be taken as evidence that they are in the 
grip of genuinely moral disgust. But it’s not obvious that this is so.    
Research that relies on participants’ self-reports of emotional experiences is often based on 
the assumption that scholars and laypeople use emotion terms in a way that reflects a shared 
meaning. However, Robin Nabi (2002) argues that this assumption is unjustified when it comes to 
disgust, because disgust terms can be used to refer to experiences of generic disgust as well as 
experiences of anger. Nabi found that the emotion terms “angry,” “disgust” and “disgusted” 
prompted participants to describe events like being treated unfairly, being offended, being lied to, 
or being cheated on (698-99).20 This, by itself, doesn’t definitively tell us that some people aren’t 
genuinely disgusted by such actions – perhaps some people find them angersome, and others find 
                                                 
20 By contrast, the trigger terms “grossed out” and “repulsed” were much more likely to prompt descriptions of 
events or objects that are generically disgusting, such as bodily products, sexual acts, insects and rodents, than 
events. 
 18 
them generically disgusting? (Kumar would surely take this as encouraging evidence in favor of 
the claim that people experience disgust in response to reciprocity violations.) Yet, Nabi also found 
that “angry,” “disgust” and “disgusted” were all associated with action tendencies characteristic 
of anger, such as the desire to retaliate or to “lash out” (701). This latter finding is suggestive of 
disgust terms being used interchangeably with anger terms, but further investigation into what 
participants mean when they use disgust language is needed to determine whether, or when, self-
reports of disgust refer to experiences of generic disgust as opposed to anger.  
To help determine whether disgust terms are being used interchangeably with anger when 
describing moral violations, Herz & Hinds (2013) examined whether participants endorsed the 
words “disgusted,” “angry,” and “grossed out” when applied to moral violations. In their study, 
they distinguished between “visceral” (i.e. generic) disgust and so-called moral disgust. The 
former is associated with visceral disgust language like “gross” or “grossed out,” but these visceral 
terms are not applied to moral violations, even though they are described as “disgusting.” Herz & 
Hinds take their findings to suggest that (so-called) moral disgust is not visceral (i.e. in my terms, 
it’s not a genuine form of disgust); rather, the use of disgust language in response to moral 
violations is indicative of anger.21  
 
Facial expressions 
As we saw earlier, Kumar infers from the fact that some participants make or select facial 
expressions characteristic of disgust in response to reciprocity violations as evidence that they are 
experiencing the emotional response that is disgust. However, we can question whether making a 
face characteristic of disgust is good evidence that someone is experiencing a disgust response 
rather than simply making the face for communication or signaling purposes.22 Further, evidence 
suggests that people are not particularly good at identifying disgust faces. People tend to confuse 
disgust faces with anger faces (Widen et al. 2004), a fact that is not surprising when we consider 
that these facial expressions share common components. The bilateral upper lip raise occurs in 
both anger and disgust expressions (Rozin et al. 1999; Rozin et al. 1994). The confusion seems to 
                                                 
21 See also Gutierrez et al. (2012), who found that the use of disgust words in response to (non-physically disgusting) 
moral violations was largely predicted by anger language.  
22 Joshua Gert has recently given a compelling account along these very lines. Gert (2015) argues that the facial 
expressions characteristic of disgust can be used to communicate one’s attitudes towards violations of moral norms 
even when one isn’t in the grip of a genuine disgust response when making the face.  
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extend to contempt, too: the unilateral lip raise is also associated with the characteristic contempt 
expression (Rozin et al. 1999), and people often mislabel photos displaying contempt faces as 
disgust faces (Vasquez et al. 2001). Though I do not have space here to discuss the implications 
of these findings in more detail, for now I hope they help make clear that the facial expression data 
Kumar relies on do not clearly support the claim that participants are responding to reciprocity 
violations with disgust.   
 
Brain activity 
Kumar refers to evidence that people who have received low ball offers in the ultimatum 
game exhibit increased activity in the anterior insula, an area of the brain that is correlated with 
disgust (Sanfey et al. 2003, discussed in Kumar 2017: 2). But the inference from insula activation 
to the experience of disgust isn’t so easy. Previous research has found that the anterior insula is 
involved in a range of negative or arousing emotional states besides disgust, such as fear and anger 
(Phan et al. 2004)/ Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of imaging studies found the anterior insula to 
be no more active during experiences of disgust than experiences of other negative emotions 
(Lindquist et al. 2012)/ This suggests that activation of the anterior insula is not uniquely associated 
with disgust, and thus cannot be taken as clear evidence of a disgust response.  
So far in this section, I have argued that these kinds of evidence about the experience of 
so-called moral disgust in response to moral violations – i.e. evidence regarding the use of disgust 
language in response to moral violations, facial expressions, and activation of the anterior insula 
– do not successfully establish that participants are experiencing disgust rather than anger. Given 
that we now find ourselves at something of an impasse, I suggest we shift our focus to a different 
set of findings that will, I hope, prove more conclusive: evidence pertaining to action tendencies. 
Following Kumar’s lead, I will primarily focus on people’s behavior in economic games. If disgust 
really is the primary emotion being elicited by bad behavior in economic games, we should expect, 
given the details of Kumar’s account, that the kind of punishment being motivated in response to 
these violations, such as rejecting low ball offers in ultimatum games, or punishing defection/free-
riding in public goods games, is best interpreted as a characteristic disgust-motivated punishment 
(e.g. a withdrawal/avoidance response like social exclusion of the wrongdoer) than a characteristic 
anger-motivated punishment (e.g. retaliation towards or confrontation of the wrongdoer). 
Rejecting offers in ultimatum games is typically understood as a form of punishment. For present 
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purposes, we need to determine whether punishing behavior in economic games is best explained 
by disgust, or by anger. In what follows, I make the case for anger.  
Punishments in economic games are commonly thought to be driven by negative emotions 
(Fehr & Gachter 2002; Xiao & Houser 2005). Participants specifically described the punishments 
they applied to free riders in a public goods game as expressions of anger (Fehr & Gachter 2002; 
Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). To support the claim that anger, as opposed to other negative emotions 
such as disgust, drives punishing behavior, we can look to the results of a large scale study, run by 
Pillutla & Murnighan (1996). Pillutla & Murnighan found that anger was the strongest predictor 
of rejections of low ball offers in ultimatum games. Anger almost always occurred in conjunction 
with perceptions of unfairness. Rejections were most frequent when responders perceived the offer 
as unfair and also attributed full knowledge – and thus full responsibility – to the person making 
the offer.  
So, it seems as if anger23 does motivate punishment behavior in economic games. But it’s 
not yet obvious why. Recall that, on the view of emotions I favor, emotions have a goal, the 
satisfaction of which is facilitated by the emotion’s characteristic action tendencies. So, we can 
now ask, what is the goal of anger in this context, and how do the action tendencies expressed by 
the punishing behavior in economic games help satisfy that goal? To help answer this question, 
let’s look to two studies by Gollwitzer and colleagues (2009; 2011), which sought to clarify what 
goal is motivating punishment behavior in economic games. In both studies, participants played a 
two-person public goods game with an unseen partner. After receiving an unfair offer, some of the 
participants had the opportunity to punish their exploitative partner by signing them up for an 
unpleasant follow-up task. One group of participants who did elect to punish then received a 
message from the wrongdoer communicating his understanding that he deserved the punishment 
he received, while other subjects did not receive any such message. When participants were asked 
how satisfied they felt after punishing the wrongdoer, Gollwitzer et al. (2011) found that 
punishment was satisfying for participants if, and only if, it was followed by a message from the 
perpetrator that showed that he was holding himself accountable for his earlier wrongdoing. 
Notably, participants who got no message from the wrongdoer were dissatisfied; interestingly, 
                                                 
23 I address the question of whether the anger that’s elicited as a response to bad behavior in economic games is generic 
anger or a distinctively moral kind of anger elsewhere in the dissertation. I argue there is a distinctively moral subtype 
of anger that is differentiable from generic anger, and that it is moral anger that drives punishing behavior in response 
to wrongdoing in economic games.  
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they were just as dissatisfied as the participants who elected not to punish the wrongdoer at all. 
Taken together, this suggests that what people are seeking when they punish people who wrong 
them is not mere retribution – i.e. people are not content simply to have an outlet for their anger – 
nor the total exclusion of the wrongdoer. Rather, punishing behavior is driven by a desire to hold 
the wrongdoer to account. The functional goal of anger, which is achieved by its distinctive action 
tendencies, is to redress the perceived injustice that has taken place. I contend that anger, which 
motivates approach action tendencies, makes better sense of the punishing behavior seen in 
economic games than disgust.  
In light of all the above considerations, we should doubt that Kumar’s account has satisfied 
condition (1) because the evidence does not successfully establish that the emotional response he 
is picking out as the response to reciprocity violations is a genuine form of disgust after all. Rather, 
I’ve argued that the evidence better supports my claim that anger is the primary response to 
reciprocity violations. The arguments of this section point to a more general lesson which applies 
to those who seek to argue in favor of the existence of genuinely moral disgust. To successfully 
shoulder the burden posed by the ontological challenge, the moral disgust proponent must provide 
unequivocal evidence that genuinely moral disgust, and not some other psychological state, is 
being elicited by (features of) relevant moral violations. Indeed, this lesson can be generalized 
even further to anyone who seeks to defend the existence of any genuinely moral emotion.  
For the sake of argument, I want to consider the following possibility: What if it turns out 
that some people really do experience reciprocity violations as morally disgusting? Kumar just 
needs to show that some people are in the grip of genuine generic disgust in response to reciprocity 
violations in order to meet condition (1), which requires that it’s necessary that a given emotional 
response be a genuine form of disgust for it to count as an instance of genuinely moral disgust. 
After all, not everyone will necessarily have the same emotional response to the same elicitors. 
Let’s grant, then, that some people are in fact responding with genuine disgust to reciprocity 
violations, and examine how Kumar’s account fares with respect to condition (2), which requires 
that a given emotional response must be genuinely moral for it to count as a form of genuinely 
moral disgust. To successfully meet this second condition, Kumar must show that his moral disgust 
is appropriately tracking (what the agent takes to be) a genuinely moral property that helps explain 
in virtue of what reciprocity violations are wrong. As we saw above, what’s distinctive about 
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reciprocity violations on Kumar’s account is that they are polluting and contaminating. I’ll address 
each of these features in turn. 
Kumar claims that reciprocity violations “pollute” by subverting shared expectations of 
reciprocity and trust during social interactions. But as I argued earlier, reciprocity violations may 
well overlap with harm violations and/or violations of special obligations in this very respect. If 
this is right, the polluting aspect is not unique to reciprocity violations and thus cannot explain 
why moral disgust as opposed to anger is best suited to respond to pollution.  
By contrast, Kumar’s account seems to gives a compelling explanation for why moral 
disgust is a uniquely appropriate response to contamination potency – its nature as a subspecies of 
generic disgust, which tracks non-moral contamination, makes it well-suited to track 
contamination in the moral domain. But why think that contamination potency – i.e. the propensity 
to circulate – is a morally relevant property? The mere propensity to spread is morally neutral: 
contagiousness is a property that both good and bad things can possess. In her account of 
descriptive moral disgust, which also identifies contamination potency as the key property that 
disgust responds to, Alexandra Plakias notes that heavy drinking, which is a thought of as a bad 
form of behavior, is socially contagious; research suggests that people are 50% more likely to drink 
heavily if some of the people they are with do so (2013: 275). On the other hand, research also 
suggests that if people think other people are already performing some right action, they 
themselves are more likely to do it, too (Giubilini 2016: 238). If morally right actions can also 
possess the property of contamination potency, then it’s hard to see how morally wrong actions 
can be wrong in virtue of their being potentially contaminating. Plakias herself acknowledges that 
whether some act really is immoral is a separate question from the question of whether that act is 
contaminating (2013: 276).24  
 
                                                 
24 We might also object to Kumar’s account and its emphasis on contamination in this way: what should we make of 
moral violations that are clearly contagious, yet don’t seem to belong in the class of reciprocity violations or elicit 
moral disgust? Take speeding, for example. Insofar as speeding presents a genuine threat to others’ well-being, it is 
best thought of as a moral rather than a conventional transgression. Both commonsense and empirical data tells us that 
that once people have seen other drivers breaking the speed limit, they themselves are much more likely to speed, too 
(Connolly & Aberg 1993). But despite speeding’s contamination potency, it doesn’t obviously inspire a disgust 
response. Nor does it neatly fit into Kumar’s class of reciprocity violations. The same could be said about looting, 
another contagious moral violation. That there are examples of contagious-but-not-disgusting moral violations is 
problematic for Kumar’s account. If contamination potency is supposed to explain why moral disgust is the proper 
response to reciprocity violations, then there is something of an explanatory hole to be filled when it comes to cases 
like speeding and looting.  
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I addressed the ontological question of whether there is such a thing as 
genuinely moral disgust. I spelled out two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust 
must satisfy, then applied these conditions to two leading accounts of moral disgust, by John Kekes 
and Victor Kumar. I concluded that neither account successfully vindicated the existence of 
genuinely moral disgust. The failures of both views are instructive, not least because they provide 
a useful illustration of just how challenging it is to provide a positive answer to the ontological 
question that satisfies the conditions I have set forth. My focus in the present chapter has been 
moral disgust, but what I have said here has clear implications for discussions of the ontological 
question as applied to other (putatively) moral emotions.    
Of course, it must be acknowledged that I can’t infer from the failure of just two accounts 
of moral disgust that no account could ever succeed at providing a positive answer to the 
ontological question. For all I’ve said here, that possibility remains open. However, though I don’t 
have space in the present chapter to defend this claim at length, I think we ought to be skeptical 
about the general prospect of providing a successful account of moral disgust. One reason for this, 
which was made salient by the examination of relevant empirical evidence in section 3.3, is the 
widespread confusion between disgust and anger. I venture that this confusion between disgust 
and anger infects both the methodological design of empirical work pertaining to moral disgust 
and scholars’ interpretations of that work. Such empirical confusion, combined with the conceptual 
obscurity about what precisely is at issue between moral disgust advocates and skeptics I identified 
at the start of this chapter, gives us strong reason to doubt that there is a distinctive psychological 
state of moral disgust. I have tried to show that there are other, better empirically-supported 
explanations of people’s emotional responses to the kinds of wrongs considered in this chapter that 
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Chapter 2 – What Makes an Emotion Moral? 
 
1. Introduction 
From the standpoint of both philosophers and psychologists, the study of moral psychology 
has undergone an affective revolution over the last twenty to thirty years (Cova, Deonna, & Sander 
2015; Haidt 2013). This revolution has brought with it renewed interest in the role of emotions in 
moral talk, thought, and behavior. One of the implications of the affective revolution is that there 
has been a significant increase in the use of the term “moral emotions,” which implies that there 
is a class of distinctively moral emotions that can be distinguished from the non-moral emotions 
(Deonna & Teroni 2012: 18). However, what scholars mean by the term “moral emotions” and 
which emotions should be included in the class denoted by the term remains unclear. C. Daniel 
Batson observes that the last twenty-five years have brought numerous claims from philosophers 
and psychologists about the importance of moral emotions, yet “explicit statements about what 
qualifies as a moral emotion have been rare” (2016: 152). Similarly, Cova and colleagues note that 
though the expression “moral emotions” 
is now widespread – and this surely reflects the general realization that emotions 
matter for morality – it is still debated what counts as a “moral emotion” and what 
emotions should be considered “moral” (Cova et al. 2015: 397). 
In this chapter, I attempt to give a novel, empirically-informed answer to the question of 
what is required for an emotion to count as a distinctively moral emotion. In so doing, I hope to 
not only provide a general answer to the methodological question of how to type-identify emotions, 
but also offer an answer to the ontological question that I raised in the first chapter with respect to 
moral disgust: how can we vindicate the existence of a distinctively moral emotion? (Recall that, 
in that chapter, I argued that for a given emotional response to count as genuinely moral disgust, 
it must be a genuine form of disgust, and it must be genuinely moral. I claimed that genuinely 
moral disgust must bear some resemblance to the generic version of disgust, i.e. it must be in the 
same emotion family, yet be distinguishable from it in virtue of its genuinely moral nature, i.e. it 
can’t be identical to the generic, non-moral version of the emotion.) 
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The present chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I examine two contemporary 
accounts of the “moral” emotions, one by psychologist Jonathan Haidt, and the other by 
philosopher Robert Solomon. I argue that Haidt’s definition of moral emotions, which focuses 
solely on their effects, is too broad, and thus fails to draw a substantive distinction between the 
moral and non-moral emotions. By contrast, Solomon’s account, which holds that the distinctively 
moral emotions are those that are constituted by a suprapersonal moral principle, yields a definition 
that’s too narrow. I contend that Solomon’s approach to defining the moral emotions fails to 
properly distinguish the moral emotions from the non-moral ones by his own lights. Further, the 
cognitivist theory of emotions that underpins his account commits him to an indefensible method 
of type-identifying emotions in general. In section 3, informed by the problems with Haidt’s and 
Solomon’s accounts, I draw from recent work by both philosophers and psychologists, most 
notably Nico Frijda (1986; 2007), Andrea Scarantino (2014), and Justin D’Arms & Daniel 
Jacobson (forthcoming), to develop a more plausible, empirically-informed account of the moral 
emotions which defines the moral emotions as those with distinctively moral action tendencies.   
Before I proceed to section 2, some caveats are in order. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, it is beyond the scope of the present project to comprehensively address the difficult 
question of how to demarcate the boundaries of the moral domain. Fortunately, my task here is 
much more modest: to provide a satisfying account of the moral emotions that successfully 
differentiates the moral emotions from the non-moral emotions in a way that does justice to the 
empirical nature of the emotions and to our moral psychology and practices. As I try to identify 
the boundary between the moral and the non-moral emotions as it is operating Haidt and 
Solomon’s accounts – and then attempt to draw it for myself – it will be useful for us to keep the 
following in mind. Allan Gibbard warns in Wise Choices, Apt Feeling that “the term ‘moral’ has 
no sharp boundaries in normal thought” (1990: 51),25 which helps explain why it is so hard to 
articulate what distinguishes the moral from the non-moral. We can begin to zero in on a useful 
conception of morality by thinking about it in the narrow sense, as opposed to understanding it 
broadly. According to Gibbard, adopting the broad conception is to understand morality as 
practical rationality (40). The morally right thing to do just is whatever is the practically rational 
thing to do (40). To put the point another way, “broadly the moral question is how to live” (6, 
                                                 
25 Bernard Williams (1981: ix) makes a related (albeit stronger) claim in the preface to Moral Luck that “there 
cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-contained theory of what morality is.” 
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emphasis added). By contrast, if we understand morality more narrowly, it makes sense to ask 
whether what’s morally right is also rational, since moral considerations are just some of the 
considerations that bear on the question of what to do (Gibbard 1990: 41; D’Arms & Jacobson 
2000). On Gibbard’s narrow view of morality, morality “concerns what is blameworthy…what is 
morally wrong and what is morally permissible” (1990: 51).26 In a slightly different (and much 
more critical) vein, Bernard Williams (1985; 1993) argues that morality, understood narrowly, is 
fundamentally about moral obligation and blame.  
There are, of course, other ways to (narrowly) define morality, and such conceptions may 
invoke concepts other than the ones mentioned so far.27 To see what those terms might be, it is 
instructive, as Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests, to pay attention to the “messy array” of terms 
we use when talking and thinking with each other about morality, which include ‘responsibilities,’ 
‘duties,’ ‘rights,’ ‘fairness’ and ‘reciprocity’ (2008: 159).28 Though I cannot settle on a precise 
definition of ‘moral’ here, for present purposes the key point is that an interesting and satisfying 
account of the moral emotions should adopt a narrow conception of morality – and may also 
centrally concern at least some of the narrowly moral concepts suggested in this section – in order 
to draw a substantive distinction between the moral and non-moral emotions. This would not be 
possible against the background of a broad conception of morality; insofar as it’s plausible to think 
that all emotions have something to do with how to live, every emotion would count as a moral 
emotion. So, for the purposes of the present chapter, we need to adopt a narrow conception of 
morality, in the hope of building towards an account that will enable us to type-identify the 
narrowly moral emotions.  
 
                                                 
26 More specifically, on Gibbard’s narrow reading “morality consists in norms for moral sentiments” (1990: 227), 
where the central moral sentiments are “guilt and resentment and their variants” (6). As will become clear later in 
the present chapter, I find Gibbard’s view very compelling and will draw from his work on these paradigmatic, 
narrowly moral emotions to motivate my own view of what it means for an emotion to count as moral. For now, 
rather than beg any questions against Haidt and Solomon about which emotions are moral and why, I just wish to 
highlight Gibbard’s main point that it is most helpful for present purposes to understand morality in a narrow rather 
than a broad sense.    
27 For example, as I discussed in the previous chapter, we might try to draw upon the moral/conventional distinction 
to see what, if anything is, distinctive about moral violations as compared to merely conventional transgressions. We 
could build upon this approach by looking to, e.g. Kurt Baier’s (1958) book, The Moral Point of View, in which 
Baier provides an account an account of the distinctively moral point of view. In so doing, Baier not also 
distinguishes morality in the narrow sense from mere systems of customs, conventions, or laws, but also identifies 
several characteristics that are distinctive of morality, such as its being impartial, universal, and categorical.  
28 Appiah also mentions ‘obligations.’ 
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2. What’s wrong with existing accounts of “moral” emotions?  
In this section, I will examine two recent accounts of the moral emotions, by Jonathan 
Haidt and Robert Solomon, which each represent a different approach to defining the moral 
emotions (and distinguishing them from the non-moral emotions). I argue that there are serious 
problems with both accounts that render them untenable.  
 
2.1 Moral emotions are beneficial to others and/or the social order 
One way of understanding an emotion as distinctively moral is to claim that it is morally 
beneficial. Though this kind of framework has been discussed by numerous theorists (Ben-Ze’ev 
1997; Ben-Ze-ev 2002; Tangney et al. 2007; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Batson 2016; Thomason 
2018), for the sake of exposition I will focus on one representative and prominent version of this 
approach to defining the moral emotions, by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2003).29  
Haidt defines the moral emotions “as those emotions that are linked to the interests or 
welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (2003: 
853).30 On this account, what primarily determines the moral nature of the moral emotions, and 
thus distinguishes them from the non-moral emotions are their effects. Haidt claims that emotions 
count as moral so long as they motivate actions which “either benefit others or else uphold or 
benefit the social order” (854). Haidt also notes that moral emotions are typically (but not 
necessarily) triggered by disinterested elicitors, such as “events that do not directly harm or benefit 
the self” (854). 
                                                 
29 Here, I want to briefly address why I’m choosing to begin with a discussion of Haidt. First, a general reason, one I 
share with Krista Thomason: “philosophy does not have the market cornered on moral emotions” (Thomason 2018: 
9). I take it as uncontroversial that philosophers need to engage with empirical work in the moral psychological 
literature in order to provide an empirically-adequate account of the moral emotions, which is my purpose here. 
Second, and more specifically, Haidt’s work about the emotions and their role in moral psychology has been highly 
influential. Haidt’s account of the moral emotions is often taken as definitive in discussions of moral emotions in the 
psychology literature (see e.g. Tangney et al. 2007), and insofar as philosophers rely on that literature for their own 
theorizing, it is worth examining Haidt’s account directly.  
30 Beyond noting that emotions are commonly analyzed as having a number of component features, such as eliciting 
events (i.e. objects), a characteristic facial expression, a phenomenological experience, and a characteristic 
motivation or action tendency, Haidt (2003) does not say more about the theory of emotion he has in mind. In his 
2012 book The Righteous Mind, Haidt writes that moral emotions are a type of moral intuition (2012: 45). Intuitions 
are “cognitions” which entails that emotions are also cognitions. Haidt does not clearly state which theory of the 
emotions he endorses for the purposes of the book, though he does assume that emotions involve appraisals with 
cognitive content (2012: 44). 
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Though Haidt takes himself to be addressing the question “how can we identify the subset 
of emotions that should be called moral emotions?” (853, my emphasis), at least in his initial 
framing of his account, he has not in fact provided an account of the moral emotions that picks out 
a subset of emotions, as opposed to the entire set. The definition Haidt provides is so broad that it 
fails to draw a substantive distinction between the moral and non-moral emotions; indeed, any 
emotion could conceivably count as moral on this view, something that Haidt himself 
acknowledges when he says, “any emotion that leads people to care about [the human social] world 
and to support, enforce, or improve its integrity should be considered a moral emotion” (855).  
I contend that a definition of the moral emotions that is so capacious as to allow any 
emotion to count as moral is untenable, and ought to be rejected.31 One reason for this is that 
Haidt’s account has no good way of marking the distinction between emotions that are distinctively 
moral, and those that are evaluative in some broader sense. For example, consider the contempt 
elicited by and directed at people who fail to “eat clean” – perhaps these people who are the objects 
of contempt are pushing shopping carts that contain more sugary sodas than produce – or who opt 
for cheeseburgers over salad. In these cases, contempt functions to uphold social norms regarding 
food, grocery shopping, and health. But it’s not clear that either contempt or the content embedded 
in the operative social norms are distinctively moral as opposed to evaluative in some wider sense 
– perhaps the soda shopper’s or burger-eater’s choices are simply being negatively evaluated as 
imprudent. We can experience negative (or positive) emotions in response to people’s grocery 
shopping and eating habits for a variety of normative reasons, not all of them moral. Daniel 
Jacobson expresses this point when he writes,  
There seems to be a crucial and obvious difference between the attitude of the 
militant vegan (who is outraged by meat eating, which he considers tantamount to 
murder) and the uptown sophisticate (who holds burger eaters in contempt for their 
bad taste) (2008: 222).  
Further, Haidt’s definition of moral emotions allows what seem like substantively immoral 
emotions to count as moral. Though Haidt refers to (the promotion of) other people’s welfare – a 
good candidate for a right-making property of action – when giving his definition of moral 
                                                 
31 C. Daniel Batson (2016) criticizes Haidt’s conception of the moral emotions as being too broad and imprecise. 
Batson thinks Haidt’s definition is better thought of as picking out a class of prosocial emotions, which is larger than 
the class of moral emotions. I agree with Batson’s general point that Haidt’s conception of the moral emotions is too 
broad, but as will be seen below, my criticisms of Haidt’s account go beyond Batson’s. 
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emotions (853), we can still question whether upholding the social order amounts to promoting 
others’ welfare, or has moral value in and of itself. For example, consider a cruel joke, shared at 
an unpopular kid’s expense, that brings amusement to a large group of high schoolers. Assuming 
that the amusement brought about by the joke yields a net benefit overall – there’s a lot of laughter, 
say, and perhaps the joke helps solidify long-lasting friendships among those who find it funny – 
Haidt’s definition commits him to calling that amusement moral, despite the fact that amusement 
at someone else’s expense, which very likely means humiliating them and causing them pain, is 
much more plausibly thought of as immoral.32 We need not look far for other examples of emotions 
that bring about effects that function to uphold the social order that are deeply morally problematic: 
just consider the widespread disgust directed at Jews by many Germans during the Holocaust, 
which facilitated (and was also taken to partially justify) their extermination (Nussbaum 2004).   
The key lesson to be taken from the shortcomings of Haidt’s account is that an interesting 
and useful account of the moral emotions must allow us to draw a substantive distinction between 
the moral and the non-moral emotions. Attempting to distinguish the moral emotions from the 
non-moral ones just in virtue of their effects on other people or on the social order as a whole, as 
Haidt does, fails as a solution to the problem of how to type-identify the moral emotions because 
it relies upon a conception of ‘moral’ that’s far too broad.  
 
2.2 Moral emotions are constituted by moral judgments  
As I have just argued, Haidt’s attempt to define the moral emotions by focusing on their 
effects is untenable because such an approach makes it possible for any emotion to count as moral. 
A more promising way to identify the moral emotions is to focus on their content. One such 
method, which promises to carve out a narrower set of the emotions than a method that focuses on 
emotions’ effects, is to ask which emotions centrally, or perhaps even constitutively, involve moral 
content.  
There are multiple ways for an emotion to involve moral content. One way is, to borrow 
John Rawls’ terms, to say that a moral emotion necessarily “invokes a moral concept” (1999: 421). 
In his discussion of what distinguishes moral emotions from the “natural” non-moral emotions and 
attitudes in A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that “it is a necessary feature of moral feelings…that 
                                                 
32 Jacobson (2008: 223) makes a similar point about amusement.  
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the person’s explanation of his experience invokes a moral concept and its associated [moral] 
principles.” The emotions of guilt, resentment, and indignation, for instance, generally invoke the 
concept of right (423).  
We can think of Rawls’ suggestion as consistent with a cognitivist view of moral emotions. 
To get clear on what this involves, let me first introduce cognitivism about the emotions more 
generally. Proponents of cognitivist theories of emotion typically claim that emotions involve 
propositional attitudes. Cognitivists attempt to define and differentiate emotions in terms of the 
content contained in these attitudes, as William Lyons does when he describes cognitivism as a 
theory of emotion “that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept of 
emotion and… essential to distinguishing different emotions from each other” (1980: 33). So, an 
emotion type is differentiable from other emotion types by the content of the propositional attitude 
it involves. For example, fear involves the belief that danger is present, whereas sadness involves 
the belief that one has suffered a loss. Rawls seems to have something like this method of 
individuation in mind for distinctively moral emotions when he says, “what distinguishes the moral 
feelings from one another are the [moral] principles…which their explanations typically invoke” 
(Rawls 1999: 422). 
While advocates of cognitivist theories of the emotions disagree about which propositional 
attitudes are necessary, and/or sufficient for emotion – judgmentalists hold that the propositional 
attitude in question is a belief or judgment, whereas quasijudgmentalists have in mind a 
propositional attitude like construal, which falls short of consciously-endorsed full belief (Roberts 
1988; 2007; 2013)33 – several prominent cognitivists, including Robert Solomon (1988; 2007) and 
Martha Nussbaum (2001; 2004) follow the Stoic tradition of identifying emotions with judgments 
alone.34 Cognitivism of this sort holds that “the beliefs involved in emotion are constitutive” 
(Nussbaum 2004: 28-29, my emphasis). There may be multiple thoughts and associated concepts 
that constitute a given emotion; Nussbaum claims that “emotions involve a complex family of 
thought” (2004: 28), Solomon thinks that most emotions are constituted by at least a dozen 
                                                 
33 Some cognitivists introduce other elements into their analyses and claim that emotions are constituted by a 
propositional attitude cluster made up of beliefs and desires. See Griffiths (1997) for a helpful overview.  
34 Cognitivists need not follow Rawls in insisting that the content of the propositional attitude must be verbally 
expressed in an explanation of the emotion, though it is common for cognitivists who take beliefs to be necessary 
features of emotions to have reportable beliefs in mind (Griffiths 1997: 27). 
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judgments (2007: 213), and Robert Roberts says that each emotion contains a “package of 
concepts” (2013: 47). 
With a version of cognitivism in mind that identifies emotions with constitutive judgments, 
it follows that specifically moral emotions will necessarily involve moral judgments. In this vein, 
Patricia Greenspan conceives of distinctively moral emotions as the subset of emotions 
“with…specifically moral content” (1998: 107 n. 7). Greenspan holds that guilt, for example, 
requires a constitutive thought about moral responsibility. To give another example of this sort of 
cognitivism applied to moral emotions, Roberts suggests that the defining proposition for 
indignation (i.e. moral anger) is: 
S has very culpably offended in the important matter of X (action or omission), and 
is bad; I am very confident of being in a moral position to condemn; S deserves 
(ought) to be hurt for X; may S be hurt for X (Roberts 2003: 215). 
In what follows, I will focus specifically on Robert Solomon’s (2007) cognitivist account 
of the emotions, with particular attention to what he has to say about the moral emotions. Solomon 
adopts a narrow view of morality, and provides an explicit, perspicuous statement of how to type-
identify the moral emotions. Since my primary aim is to investigate the question of how to define 
the moral emotions given a narrow conception of morality, Solomon is an excellent cognitivist 
representative for my purposes.35      
Solomon claims, in line with the central cognitivist commitment, that “emotions are 
constituted or structured by evaluative judgments” (2007: 209). Further, he holds that “an 
understanding of emotions… involves an understanding of the judgments that structure them… 
[and] it is the nature of these judgments that determines the type of emotion” (209). These 
constitutive judgments can differ radically between emotions, can be very precise and fine-grained, 
and involve quite sophisticated concepts. For example, pride and jealousy involve judgments of 
entitlement, and contempt involves judgments of “relative merit and status” (167).  
On Solomon’s view, then, identifying and distinguishing between emotion types involves 
identifying and differentiating between the evaluative judgments that constitute them. In line with 
                                                 
35 In contrast to Solomon, both Roberts (2007; 2013) and Nussbaum (2001; 2004) seem to be operating with a 
broader conception of morality than I’m interested in exploring here. Roberts explicitly states that he is using 
“moral” in a wider sense, akin to Bernard William’s (1985) notion of “ethical.” Similarly, Nussbaum’s brand of 
cognitivism identifies emotions with eudaimonistic judgments. On this view, all emotions are moral in a broad 
(“ethical”) sense because all emotions are constituted by judgments about human flourishing.  
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the suggestion I made earlier about a cognitivist theory of specifically moral emotions, Solomon 
claims that distinctively moral emotions are constituted by moral judgments (167). More 
specifically, the moral emotions – a class Solomon takes to include shame, guilt, regret, envy, 
remorse, pride, grief, and moral indignation, some members of which I will discuss in more detail 
below – are the subset of the emotions that are structured by moral principles. Solomon suggests 
that moral principles are suprapersonal, in the sense that they tend to be impersonal and 
generalizable (207).   
By way of illustration, Solomon discusses the paradigm case of moral indignation, which 
he describes as “a special kind of evaluative judgment embodying a moral principle” (207). Moral 
indignation is, unsurprisingly, a form of anger. It is, however, distinguishable from non-moral 
(what I call generic) anger in virtue of its moral content. Non-moral anger is a personal judgment 
that I, or someone close to me, have been offended (208). By contrast, moral indignation is “anger 
with suprapersonal moral clout” (40); in other words, it has an “essential moral component” (254) 
that generic anger lacks. More specifically, moral indignation is constituted by the judgment, “This 
is wrong!” Importantly, the “wrongness need not have anything in particular to do with me, my 
tastes, or my personal values” (207) – this is what makes it suprapersonal, for Solomon. For my 
current purposes, the invocation of wrongness is good evidence that Solomon has a narrow 
conception of morality in mind.  
Moral indignation is also distinct from irritation and annoyance. The difference is not about 
the comparative severity or intensity of the affective state; Solomon rightly points out that one can 
be greatly annoyed, even “to the point of distraction,” and that it’s possible for one to experience 
a mild, even “cool,” bout of moral indignation (207). Rather, consistent with Solomon’s general 
theory of the emotions, the difference lies in the evaluative structure of these states, where the 
structure is determined by the judgments that constitute them.    
Assuming that it is possible to generalize from the specific case of moral indignation, 
Solomon might be thought to have provided a clear method for distinguishing the moral emotions 
from the non-moral emotions. The difference between the two classes of emotions lies in the 
content embedded in the emotions’ conceptual structure. Moral emotions are constituted by moral 
judgments, which invoke suprapersonal moral principles, whereas non-moral emotions are 
constituted by non-moral (yet still evaluative) judgments. To work out whether an emotion is 
moral, we just need to work out which moral principle its constitutive judgment contains.   
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However, it’s not at all clear that Solomon’s method for defining the moral emotions picks 
out all the emotions he wishes to deem moral, which is a surprisingly large collection. Recall that 
Solomon says that, in addition to moral indignation, the following emotions belong in the class of 
the moral emotions: shame, guilt, regret, remorse, envy, pride, and grief. However, besides moral 
indignation, which Solomon uses as the illustrative, paradigm example of a moral emotion, 
Solomon does not explicitly identify the moral principles that the other (putatively) moral emotions 
are structured by. In what follows, I will examine Solomon’s analyses of three moral emotions – 
pride, grief, and envy – to assess whether his approach to defining the moral emotions succeeds. I 
argue that it does not: Solomon does not obviously have a coherent notion of which principles are 
moral, and in the case of grief is invoking a different sense of ‘moral’ than the one his cognitivist 
methodology for individuating emotions prescribes. It will also be seen that there are more general 
problems with the cognitivist method of type-identification of emotions that Solomon relies upon.    
Let’s begin with pride. Solomon considers pride a “positive, self-evaluative… emotion of 
self-praise” (90). Solomon considers pride a member of the class of emotions that “are not only 
emotions about the self but emotions about responsibility, including moral responsibility” (90). 
The evaluations that are constitutive of pride are about one having done something, or possessing 
some trait, that is meritorious, such as winning a race (100). The evaluations are self-ascribed, yet 
are what Solomon describes as “social” or “tribal,” in the sense that these ascriptions depend on 
one’s membership or status in the community. This can be seen in the example Solomon gives of 
out-of-shape sports fans who are “entitled to feel proud of their team insofar as they are part of the 
community” (100). 
However, nothing in Solomon’s analysis of pride suggests that a judgment embodying a 
principle about moral responsibility is constitutive of pride. And even if Solomon’s discussion was 
faithful to his own claim about the nature of pride, the claim that pride is constituted by judgments 
of moral responsibility is deeply implausible. Solomon, however, does not stick to his own 
definition. Solomon deems the pride of the unfit sports fans in their team’s victory a genuine 
instance of pride, despite spelling out the example in such a way that the fans have “contributed 
nothing to the team’s victory” (100). With this detail of the case in mind, we might even doubt 
whether a judgment about responsibility of any sort is necessary.  
Leaving this last objection aside, let us grant, for the sake of argument, that pride centrally 
involves judgments of responsibility. Consider, for example, the pride Brent feels in running a 
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marathon in under 3 hours, a time fast enough to gain entry to the Boston marathon in his age 
group. Unlike the unfit sports fans, it’s clear that Brent is responsible for his (genuinely impressive) 
achievement, and in feeling proud of his performance in the marathon, he is positively evaluating 
himself. But what moral principle could possibly be structuring Brent’s experience of pride? We 
can feel proud of all kinds of things we’re (at least partially) responsible for; an academic can be 
proud of the book she wrote, a 4-year-old can be proud of having learned to tie his shoes, the 
individual members of the Golden State Warriors basketball team can be proud of having won 
back-to-back championships, and one’s parents can be proud of the adult their child has grown up 
to become. We may even feel genuine (and fitting) pride when we haven’t been directly 
responsible for, yet have been proximate enough to feel personally invested in, someone else’s 
achievement, such as when one’s dear friend graduates from their doctoral program, gets a great 
job, or overcomes a long and difficult illness with strength and grace. Though it is possible for 
pride to take objects with moral content –  take, for example, a middle schooler who sees their 
classmate being cruelly made fun of and bravely steps in to stand up to the bully – it’s fair to say 
that pride doesn’t typically take moral objects or involve judgments with specifically moral 
content. As such, we should reject Solomon’s analysis of pride and deny that pride is constituted 
by judgments that contain moral principles about responsibility. This is not to say that pride can’t 
ever have anything to do with morality. But Solomon’s analysis does not establish that pride is a 
good candidate for a distinctively moral emotion, because many instances of pride do not use moral 
concepts or concern anything particularly relevant to morality, understood in a narrow sense. 
Let’s move on to Solomon’s analysis of grief. Solomon writes that grief is a moral emotion, 
in the following sense:  
Grief is not only expected as the appropriate reaction to the loss of a loved one, but 
it is in a strong sense obligatory. We are not just surprised when a person shows no 
signs of grief after a very personal loss. We are morally outraged and condemn such 
a person (75, emphasis in original). 
The sense of “moral” Solomon is invoking in this passage is that of moral appropriateness. The 
experience of grief in response to the death of a loved one is not just permissible, but is morally 
required, and anyone who fails to have this reaction is failing to do something that is expected of 
them, morally speaking. However, as I discussed at length in the previous chapter, we need to take 
care to differentiate between the different ways an emotion can be described as “moral.” To call 
an emotion moral, in the sense that we are morally required to feel it, is different to calling an 
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emotion moral in the ontological sense, which amounts to offering an answer to the question of 
how to vindicate the existence of a distinctively moral emotional kind. In claiming that moral 
emotions are constituted by moral judgments, Solomon is plausibly read as offering an answer to 
the ontological question, which requires an answer that’s distinct from the positive answer given 
in response to the question about grief’s moral appropriateness.  
It might be that Solomon thinks that grief is moral in the appropriateness sense and also 
moral in the sense that it is constituted by a moral judgment. Solomon holds that the judgments 
that constitute grief are, roughly, that one has lost someone or something and it is a terrible loss 
that erodes one’s sense of self (76). These judgments are evaluative, to be sure, but as was the case 
with Solomon’s discussion of pride, they do not obviously centrally contain moral content. The 
loss of a loved one, perhaps the paradigmatic elicitor of grief, is in many cases terrible, as Solomon 
rightly says, but it is difficult to see how the life- and even identity-altering terribleness of the loss 
that characterizes one’s experience of grief (as opposed to, say, anger at the perceived cosmic 
injustice of a loved one being taken too soon, even if they died naturally and peacefully) can be 
made sense of using moral notions like wrongness or responsibility (etc.). 
Finally, let’s consider Solomon’s analysis of envy. Solomon claims that envy involves a 
negative self-evaluation, where the defining judgment is: “I do not have anything like a right or a 
claim to the possession or talent or honor in question” [and I want it] (102). Central to envy is the 
idea that one doesn’t just want what someone else possesses; “it is wanting it without merit, 
without any intelligible claim of a right to it, without any real hope of getting it” (101).  
Solomon discusses a wide variety of objects that can elicit envy: someone else’s looks, 
their birthright, or their skills or abilities, like the ability to learn languages quickly (102). We can 
also envy others for the deserved honors they have received – Solomon speaks of envying Russell 
Crowe his Academy Award for Best Actor, even though Solomon says he himself is “not an actor 
and [has] never displayed any acting talent at all” (102).  
The constitutive judgment(s) for envy include broadly evaluative notions of ‘desert’ or 
‘rights,’ but there’s nothing to suggest that these concepts can be understood in a narrowly moral 
way. Based on the collection of envy elicitors he suggests, it’s doubtful that Solomon even intends 
to invoke a moral notion of rights. In speaking of my right (or lack thereof) to be as beautiful or as 
good a singer as Beyoncé, I’m just not talking about the same kind of thing as, say, the rights of 
immigrants to be treated with dignity and kindness at the US-Mexico border.   
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We can also question Solomon’s stipulation that envy requires the thought that one has no 
claim to the thing one wishes to possess. Solomon is essentially making the empirical claim that 
someone can only be in a state of envy if they make the judgment that they want the possession, 
talent, honor, or trait (etc.) in question, yet do not have a right or a claim to it. But it seems very 
plausible for us to envy someone when, or even because, we do have a claim to the thing they have 
that we want. For example, suppose that two graduate students are equally qualified for, and thus 
deserving of, a coveted and lucrative fellowship. Since the candidates can’t be separated on the 
basis of merit, the recipient of the fellowship is determined by the outcome of a coin toss. In this 
case, it seems as if the unlucky loser would be just as envious of the winner as the other graduate 
students who weren’t deserving of the fellowship, if not more so, yet the “without merit” part of 
Solomon’s definition commits him to denying that this is a real instance of envy.  
Given the cognitivist theory Solomon endorses, it is his prerogative to stipulate which 
evaluative judgment(s) define emotion types. But this methodology is vulnerable to 
counterexamples, as I just demonstrated. In response to the counterexample I raised about genuine 
cases of envy seeming possible in the absence of a constitutive judgment that includes the part 
about wanting what someone else has without merit, Solomon might say that I have identified 
another emotion-type, differentiable from envy on the basis of its slightly-different constitutive 
thought, which doesn’t include the “without merit” clause. This move, which involves the drawing 
of very fine-grained distinctions between emotions, brings with it two main problems. First, it 
threatens to give way to a proliferation of emotion-types, each defined by increasingly specific 
constitutive judgments, with each new emotion-type adding weight to the cognitivist’s ontological 
burden. Second, and relatedly, it “threatens to turn seemingly genuine disputes over the nature of 
an emotion into merely terminological quarrels” (D’Arms & Jacobson 2003: 133). We should also 
recall that, in the previous subsection, a genuine instance of pride failed to meet Solomon’s 
stipulated definition – i.e. pride is constituted by judgments of moral responsibility, yet the unfit 
sports fans who bore no responsibility, let alone moral responsibility, for their team’s victory count 
as being in a state of pride – by Solomon’s own lights. I take this to suggest that Solomon himself 
sometimes has trouble sticking to the dictates of the cognitivist methodology to which he is 
antecedently committed. 
These considerations give us reason to object not just to Solomon’s account of the moral 
emotions in particular, but also to the cognitivist methodology for type-identifying emotions in 
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general. As I will explain in more detail below, a theory of the emotions which seeks to define and 
individuate emotions primarily on the basis of their distinctive action tendencies – that is, how 
people are typically impelled to act when in the grip of a given emotion – can avoid the problems 
that come with the cognitivist’s approach to defining emotions. Whereas cognitivists seek to 
determine what is (and isn’t) a genuine token of an emotion type according to whether the 
stipulated constitutive judgment is made, the motivational theory allows us to look at the world 
and observe how people actually behave in order to work out whether they are experiencing a 
given emotion. On the motivational view – properly spelled out with appropriate details about 
which action tendencies and goals are characteristic of which emotion types – claims about what 
counts as envy (or pride, or grief, or moral indignation, and so on) can be vindicated by empirical 
observation. Importantly, they can also be falsified. This approach allows for genuine disputes 
about the nature of emotions to be settled without resorting to the questionable cognitivist move 
of drawing additional distinctions between emotion-types when faced with counterexamples. The 
motivational theory generates predictions about people’s behavior that can be tested empirically, 
which means that we need not rely only on (possibly idiosyncratic) conceptual analysis or 
linguistic intuitions about the nature of emotions. As I argued in chapter 1 with respect to moral 
disgust, folk language about the emotions shouldn’t always be taken at face value.  
In light of the various problems we’ve encountered with Solomon’s analyses of three of 
his (so-called) moral emotions, I claim that the distinction Solomon draws between moral emotions 
and non-moral emotions is deficient. As I discussed at the outset of this chapter, there are several 
ways to draw the moral/non-moral distinction, such as by relying on the idea that morality is 
centrally about wrongness, obligation, moral responsibility, duty, or fairness, etc. But only 
Solomon’s definition of moral indignation plausibly invokes one of these notions (wrongness). 
Further, my discussion of Solomon’s account of envy helped bring out some more general 
problems with his underlying cognitivist methodology for type-individuating emotions.  
It might be suggested at this point that my rejection of the cognitivist approach to defining 
the moral emotions is too brisk. My arguments against cognitivism have centered primarily on my 
rejection of Solomon’s analyses of particular emotions, which, one might argue, is too thin a base 
on which to advance the general conclusion that the cognitivist approach should be rejected. It is 
true that my general rejection of cognitivism has leaned heavily on my specific rejection of 
Solomon’s cognitivist account, but as I alluded to above, I think there are good reasons to worry 
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about the cognitivist methodology for type-identifying the emotions in general, and the moral 
emotions in particular. Essentially, if the cognitivist is right, and the moral emotions are those that 
are constituted by a thought or proposition containing moral content, it would be possible to 
generate a moral variant of every single emotion type simply by adding a moral concept to every 
generic emotion’s constitutive thought. Though cognitivism initially seemed to offer a more 
promising method for carving out a narrower set of moral emotions than Haidt’s effects-based 
approach, cognitivism provides us with what turns out to be a very cheap way of defining the moral 
emotions that has the unwelcome implication of allowing every emotion type to be made a moral 
emotion by stipulation. For example, consider two cases of pride: someone who is proud at having 
generously donated to a worthwhile charitable cause, and another who is proud at having reached 
a personal fitness goal, such as lifting more weight than they’ve ever lifted before. The cognitivist 
approach to type-identifying emotions suggests that, just by building content about the moral worth 
of the donation into the first person’s constitutive thought, they are thereby in the grip of a 
distinctively moral kind of pride. Moral pride is differentiable from the state of pride the weight 
lifter is in, which we might think just is regular pride, but risks being type-identified by the 
cognitivist as another kind of pride: strength pride, say. This example shows how unilluminating 
it is to differentiate pride at one’s generosity from pride at one’s strength as distinct emotion kinds 
according to which concepts are contained in emotions’ constitutive thoughts. Instead, it is more 
plausible to think there is one emotion type – namely, pride – which can take different objects and 
generate a variety of pride tokens that involve different concepts, depending on the particular 
eliciting conditions.  
 Insofar as we care about marking a meaningful distinction between the subset of emotions 
that are distinctively moral and the non-moral emotions, I maintain that cognitivism should be 
rejected, because its methodology for type-identifying emotions allows for there to be a moral 
version of every emotion, and thus obscures that distinction. Since I am committed to avoiding 
that outcome, it had better be the case for my purposes that cognitivism is false. However, it must 
be acknowledged that if someone were to come along and offer a compelling response to the 
arguments I’ve made against cognitivism, I had better have something more to say, or else risk the 
remainder of my arguments in this chapter, and the next – which depend upon cognitivism’s being 
false – falling through.   
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In the next section, I will discuss my preferred theory of emotion in more detail. One of 
the aims of the next section will be to establish that the motivational theory can avoid the problems 
faced by cognitivism and provide us with a viable way of type-identifying emotions – including 
the distinctively moral emotions. 
 
3. An alternative account of the moral emotions  
In section 2, I examined two accounts of the moral emotions by Jonathan Haidt and Robert 
Solomon and rejected both as untenable. But my discussion of these accounts has given rise to two 
helpful insights, which I will elaborate on in this section in order to motivate and spell out an 
alternative account of the moral emotions.  
In section 2.1, I argued that Haidt’s attempt to define the moral emotions in virtue of their 
effects yielded an account that failed to draw a substantive or interesting distinction between the 
moral emotions and the non-moral ones. Yet, Haidt’s view does seem to get something important 
right: recall that Haidt says that emotions count as moral so long as they generate actions which 
benefit others, and/or uphold or benefit the social order (Haidt 2003: 854). Haidt is right to the 
extent that he acknowledges that the action tendencies of emotions matter when it comes to 
figuring out which emotions are the moral ones. However, unlike Haidt, we need to pay more 
attention to the character of the action tendencies that are associated with different emotions, and 
what they are for, which requires a focus that’s substantially narrower than Haidt’s unconstrained 
focus on the various effects that follow from these action tendencies. Below, I aim to show that an 
emotion can be characterized as a moral emotion in virtue of its having distinctively moral action 
tendencies. On the picture I will defend, an emotion can count as moral even if it does not bring 
about a net benefit to others and/or the social order.  
Solomon’s account (and, more broadly, the general cognitivist approach to defining moral 
emotions) also gets something right, in that it reflects the plausible idea that we can define the 
moral emotions as the subset of emotions that involve, or invoke, moral content. Where Solomon 
goes wrong is its adoption of the view that moral emotions are constituted by moral judgments. 
Instead, we should take seriously the possibility that moral emotions involve moral content without 
necessarily being constituted by moral judgments or thoughts. D’Arms and Jacobson, for example, 
defend the idea that emotions (in general) are quasi-perceptual, in the sense that “emotions present 
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things to us as having evaluative features” (2000: 72).36 If we apply this insight to specifically 
moral emotions, the idea is that moral emotions perceive and represent their objects as having 
distinctively moral features (e.g. wrongness, unfairness, or some other moral notion(s) that should 
be familiar from some of our earlier discussion of narrowly moral concepts).  
In the remainder of this section, I defend a motivational theory of emotion37 according to 
which emotions are syndromes of feeling, appraisal, and motivation. Crucially, motivation is 
central to the syndrome, in the sense that emotions are primarily defined and individuated 
according to their motivational profile. Once a general version of the motivational view – so-
named to highlight that I take the motivational component to be particularly central to the 
syndrome – is on the table, I will then apply it to the paradigmatic moral emotion, guilt, to 
demonstrate that a motivational theory of moral emotions is a viable possibility. I suggest that the 
application to guilt helps support my earlier claim that a motivational theory of moral emotion can 
capture the Haidt-inspired insight that what the emotions impel us to do is important for classifying 
them as moral (or not). Additionally, I suggest that the motivational view’s appraisal component 
can make sense of the Solomon/cognitivist-inspired insight that moral emotions involve narrowly 
moral content.   
At this point, I must flag that throughout this chapter and the next, I sometimes talk about 
the emotions as syndromes, and sometimes speak more specifically in terms of the motivational 
theory of emotion. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, or indeed this entire project, to 
comprehensively defend a novel theory of the emotions. I should admit that, in my thinking about 
which theory of the emotions to defend, I am pulled in two not-entirely-consistent directions. The 
first, weaker view of the emotions I draw on is the view that emotions are syndromes which are 
made up of an appraisal component, a phenomenological component, and a motivational 
component. The second, stronger view builds upon the first to insist that the motivational 
component is the most important part of the syndrome, which means that other elements are less 
                                                 
36 Cf. Christine Tappolet (2016), who defends an all-out (as opposed to quasi-) perceptual theory of the emotions 
according to which emotions are perceptions of value.  
37 Some scholars have expressed doubt over whether the wide, varied assortment of psychological states we 
typically think of as emotions form a unified class that lends itself to proper definition (e.g. Rorty 1980; Griffiths 
1997). Yet, most contemporary emotion theorists tend to assume that there are some shared features in virtue of 
which (so-called) emotions all count as emotions. As Jesse Prinz observes, “the very idea that there can be a theory 
of emotions, as opposed to several different theories, carries this presupposition” (Prinz 2004: 79, emphasis in 
original). Here, for the sake of simplicity I am operating under this presupposition. In so doing, I follow the lead of 
several emotion theorists (e.g. Frijda & Scherer 2009; Cova & Deonna 2014; Deonna & Scherer 2010). 
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important to establishing the existence of an emotion. A given psychological state might lack any 
a characteristic thought, or not be felt very strongly and still count as an emotion if the motivational 
element is there. By contrast, if the motivational component is missing – a possibility suggested in 
cases where it appears that a given emotion hasn’t generated any actions – I must be able to provide 
a compelling explanation for why the motivation really is present, despite appearances, that isn’t 
worryingly post hoc. If I’m unable to do that, then I must instead give up the part of the theory 
which accords primacy to the motivational element, and revert to the weaker view of the emotions 
according to which the motivational element is on equal footing with the appraisal and 
phenomenological components. In the remainder of this chapter, I will declare my allegiance to 
the stronger motivational view and say some things in its favor, while acknowledging that I am 
unable to mount a full defense of it. It is my hope that, if the reader finds this sketch of the 
motivational theory unconvincing, they will allow me to fall back on the weaker, syndrome view 
of emotions, which I wager can still do the work I need it to do in the present project, as long as 
the following anti-cognitivist commitment holds: that any thoughts involved in the emotional 
syndrome are characteristic, not constitutive.  
 3.1 The motivational theory of (all) emotions 
Emotions are typically thought to involve “appraising a stimulus [or object] a particular 
way, feeling a particular way, and being motivated to act a particular way” (Scarantino 2014: 156). 
As Andrea Scarantino observes, emotion theorists of various stripes generally accept that emotions 
have these three components, while zeroing in on one particular aspect as an entry point to the 
question of how to explain what emotions are. For example, as we’ve seen, cognitivists focus on 
the cognitive element of the appraisal, insisting that it takes the form of a constitutive judgment, 
whereas perceptualists (e.g. Prinz 2004) focus on the feelings aspect of emotions. What’s 
distinctive about the motivational theory is that it gives primacy to the motivational dimension of 
emotions, while still making sense of their appraisal and feeling aspects. 
In endorsing a motivational theory of emotion, I am following the lead of psychologist 
Nico Frijda (1986; 2007), who gives the most extensive and influential treatment of the 
motivational theory of emotion, Andrea Scarantino (2014), who develops his own motivational 
account of the emotions inspired by Frijda, and Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (forthcoming), 
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who also follow Frijda in spelling out their motivational theory of the natural emotions.38 I argue 
that the motivational view of the emotions, properly spelled out and applied to the subset of the 
moral emotions, enables us to identify the moral emotions as those emotions with distinctively 
moral action tendencies that aim at a distinctively moral goal. We can tell emotions apart, thereby 
distinguishing between the moral and the non-moral emotions, primarily by attending to emotions’ 
specific goal-directed actions. 
Before I get to the most distinctive aspects of the motivational theory, I shall first spell out 
some other features of emotions, about which there is broad consensus among emotion theorists 
(see, e.g. Deonna & Scherer 2010; Frijda & Scherer 2009; Roberts 1988; Gibbard 1990; de Sousa 
1987; Frijda & Scherer 2009; Ben-Ze’ev 2010; Deonna & Scherer 2010; Cova & Deonna 2014; 
Deonna & Teroni 2012; Teroni 2007). Given that I ultimately want to provide an account that can 
make sense of the idea that the moral emotions are recognizable as a subset of the general class of 
emotions, it is worth first spending some time unpacking the key elements of a general theory of 
emotions.  
The first important characteristic of emotions is that they are intentional states that are 
about, or directed at objects.39 Objects can be events, actions, people, states, etc. To get at the idea 
that emotions are always about or directed at objects, consider that “anger is anger about something 
or at someone, jealousy is directed at a rival over someone, shame is shame of oneself because of 
some trait or act” (Deonna & Scherer, 2010: 44, emphasis in original).  
Emotions can be said to have or take objects in different ways. The first way of thinking 
about this is to identify the particular object, sometimes also called the elicitor, that the emotion 
is about. For example, I may be sad that my favorite dumpling restaurant closed down, or you may 
be angry that a stranger entered your office without permission. The second way of thinking about 
emotions’ objects is to identify the appraisal, also sometimes referred to as the formal object 
(Teroni 2007) or core relational theme (Lazarus 1991) of an emotion type.  
Importantly, emotions are elicited by objects that are relevant to the subject, in the sense 
that they are linked to the subject’s needs, goals, values, or well-being (Deonna & Scherer 2010). 
The object is appraised by the subject as having this this relevance (or value or importance). So, 
                                                 
38 D’Arms and Jacobson (forthcoming) hold that the natural emotions are a subset of the emotions that are 
psychological kinds. 
39 I am again following Scarantino in adding the element of intentionality to the motivational theory of emotion. 
Intentionality is “an ingredient sorely missing from Frijda’s [original] account” (Scarantino 2014: 169). 
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emotions represent their objects evaluatively. Different instances of an emotion-type may well be 
elicited by a wide variety of particular objects, but the appraisal will be the same across those 
instances. For example, sadness can be elicited by a break up, the death of a loved one, having to 
move out of a favorite apartment, or a cherished possession stolen from one’s car. As different as 
these objects are from one another, in each case sadness appraises the situation as involving the 
loss of something valuable.40  
Next, emotions are felt, and these feelings tend to reflect bodily changes or reactions 
(Roberts 1988; Prinz 2004; Deonna & Scherer 2010; Cova & Deonna 2014). These bodily changes 
include things like changes to one’s breathing, heart rate, the prickling of tears, feelings of heat or 
warmth, goose bumps, a lump in the throat, and so on. It is notoriously tricky to give 
comprehensive descriptions of the phenomenology of emotions – and, indeed, for affective states 
in general (Cova & Deonna 2014), but for now it should suffice to note that there is something 
“that it is like” to be in the grip of an emotion. It also bears noting that emotions are typically 
experienced as unified states of mind rather than as sets of components (Roberts 1988; Gibbard 
1990; Deonna & Scherer 2010.).  
We’re now in a position to focus on the motivational part of the motivational theory. 
According to the motivational view, emotional episodes – understood as transitory bouts elicited 
by an object – are goal-directed states of action readiness. Every emotion has a specific goal or 
aim, and every emotion involves action tendencies that aim at that goal. Emotions are better 
thought of as involving readiness for its goal rather than involving readiness for a specific behavior, 
since a number of quite different actions could be appropriate means to reaching the emotion’s 
overall goal. The goal unites the disparate actions someone might take while in the grip of an 
emotional episode; for example, someone in the grip of fear might run, hide, or freeze. Further, 
the goal identifies the outcome(s) that would satisfy the emotion. For example, if running away 
allows the frightened person to avoid the danger they are in, the goal of that episode of fear has 
been achieved, and the emotion should subside. 
The action readiness of emotions involves a felt urgency to act as quickly as possible to 
achieve the emotion’s specific goal, and is characterized by (what Frijda calls) control precedence 
                                                 
40 It’s worth noting that what constitutes a loss or instance of perceived contamination (and so on) may well be in 
part socially constructed. As such, we should expect the particular elicitation conditions for emotions to depend on 
social relations and factors and to vary somewhat cross-culturally. Even so, there is substantial agreement across 
people and cultures when it comes to which particular objects will evoke certain emotions. 
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(Frijda 1986; 2007; Scarantino 2014; D’Arms & Jacobson forthcoming). This means that emotions 
tend to seek precedence over and control behavior, planning, thought, attention, and experience, 
and may interfere with or interrupt ongoing thoughts and behaviors. Emotions tend to narrow one’s 
attentional focus, restricting access to information one already has, or could otherwise more easily 
get, were it not for the influence of the emotion. Emotions also prioritize their characteristic goals, 
which means that they persist while the goal remains unsatisfied, even in the face of interruptions 
or obstacles, and are insensitive “to considerations of propriety and… unwanted consequences of 
instigated actions” (Deonna & Scherer 2010: 51, discussing Frijda 2007). Emotions’ goal 
prioritization also means that emotions typically motivate one to seek the most direct means to 
goal satisfaction, which may or may not be the most effective course of action. Lastly, an emotion’s 
control precedence underlines the appraised relevance, value, or importance of whatever it is that 
elicited the emotion.  
 
3.2 The motivational theory of moral emotions: the case of guilt 
In the preceding section, I outlined the key features of the motivational theory of emotion. 
Here, to illustrate how the motivational theory works in the case of specifically moral emotions, I 
apply the motivational theory to what is widely considered a quintessential moral emotion: guilt 
(see e.g. Williams 1973; Gibbard 1990). In their survey article about moral emotions, Jesse Prinz 
and Shaun Nichols write that “no other emotion is more directly associated with morality” [than 
guilt]. Though I do not have space in the present chapter to present the many references in the 
philosophy and moral psychological literatures to guilt as a moral emotion, I take it that assessing 
how, or whether, the motivational theory can make sense of the empirical nature of a paradigmatic 
moral emotion – and guilt is the best emotion for this job – is a useful strategy for testing the 
motivational theory’s adequacy. Both of my foils from the previous section, Haidt (2003) and 
Solomon (2007) agree that guilt counts as a moral emotion, so I am hopeful that they (and others) 
will allow me to assume guilt does count as a moral emotion for the purposes of assessing whether 
the motivational theory of moral emotions can capture this important datum.  
Guilt typically arises when a person feels as if they’ve done something wrong, thereby 
violating a moral norm (Baumeister et al. 1994; Tangney et al. 2007; Prinz 2009; Prinz & Nichols 
2010). Importantly, guilt is especially likely to arise when we take ourselves to have caused harm 
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to another person, and is felt most intensely when the victim is a loved one. While thoughts of 
responsibility for the harm are a common feature of guilt experiences, it’s important to note that 
people can feel genuinely guilty even when they are not in fact responsible for harming anyone. 
For example, people who keep their jobs when others are laid off feel guilty, as do those who 
receive greater recognition or rewards than a peer who is equally deserving. A more extreme 
example is that of survivor guilt: people who survived the Holocaust, the AIDS epidemic among 
gay men, and other catastrophes or atrocities often report feeling guilty for surviving, especially if 
people they cared about were killed (Prinz & Nichols 2010; Baumeister et al. 1994).  
Assuming that the self-reported guilt in these cases reflects genuine guilt experiences, these 
examples might be taken to suggest that guilt does not, in fact, have any special connection to 
moral violations or to bearing moral responsibility for causing harm. Prinz & Nichols suggest that 
the best way to make sense of survivor guilt cases, and other instances of guilt without (actual) 
moral violations, is to think of these cases of over-extensions of core guilt cases that do involve 
transgressions. In these cases, the violations are conceived of as omissions – i.e. failures to act that 
bring about harm, rather than active commission of harm. They write,  
People who experience survivor guilt feel responsible for the misery of others. They 
sometimes say that they should have done more to help. It seems that survivors 
erroneously believe that they have violated a norm; they think they were obligated 
to protect [the other people who didn’t survive, especially] their loved ones and 
were in a position to do so (Prinz & Nichols 2010: 134).     
We might also think about the guilt in survivor guilt cases and cases of inequity as 
essentially involving the ideas of desert or unfairness, both of which are narrowly more notions 
that have a connection to responsibility. If this is right, Prinz and Nichols suggest we should think 
of guilt’s appraisal, or core relational theme, as something like: “someone I am concerned about 
has been harmed and I have responsibility for that in virtue of what I have done or failed to do” 
(134). There is a lot of content in this appraisal, but the motivational theory need not hold that it’s 
necessary for people to explicitly form this thought (or something close to it) to be in a state of 
guilt, as cognitivist theories of guilt would. Guilt appraises its object as having certain (narrowly) 
moral features – i.e. harm, wrongness, responsibility – and evaluatively presents it as such to its 
subject. I contend that this analysis of guilt’s appraisal both does justice to the empirical character 
of guilt and supports the claim that moral emotions involve moral content. 
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Further, this formulation of guilt’s appraisal helps unify the varied circumstances that elicit 
guilt as those in which people conceive of themselves as somehow responsible for causing harm, 
even though they may not in fact have been causally responsible. The question of whether guilt is 
fittingly or correctly elicited in all these cases – we might question whether Holocaust survivors’ 
guilt is warranted, given that they do not bear responsibility for the deaths of those they cared 
about41 – is a separate question of whether guilt is genuinely elicited in these cases. The appraisal 
I’ve put forward here as characteristic of guilt helps explain the latter question, but not the former, 
which is as it should be, given that my target of inquiry is ontological. The issue of when and 
whether we’re dealing with a genuine instance of an emotion is distinguishable from the issue of 
whether that emotion is fitting. To address the latter, we could ask whether guilt’s appraisal 
accurately or correctly represents its object, given the specific circumstance and eliciting 
conditions, but, crucially, we should recognize that such a question presupposes that the emotional 
state in question is an instance of guilt.  
Let’s now consider what guilt’s characteristic action tendencies are, and what goal those 
action tendencies aim at. Guilt may involve characteristic thoughts of having done wrong (Lewis 
1971) and how the norm violation has affected others (Tangney et al. 2007). This captures the idea 
that people in the grip of guilt are more likely to focus their attention on others, e.g. by focusing 
on how their wrongdoing has affected the victim, rather than focusing on themselves (Tangney et 
al. 1994, cited in Tangney et al. 2007). This last point connects to why guilt characteristically 
motivates reparative actions.42 Bernard Williams captures this when he writes, “[h]e who thinks 
he has done wrong may not just torment himself, he may seek to put things together again” 
(Williams 1973: 222). The kinds of reparative actions characteristic of guilt include confessions, 
apologies, forgiveness-seeking (Riek et al. 2014), and attempts to make up for or mitigate the 
negative consequence of the wrong or harm one has perpetrated. People may also actively seek 
punishment (Baumeister et al. 1994). Guilt, then, is best thought of as an other-oriented emotion, 
with action tendencies that motivate approach, not avoidance. It’s not hard to see that these action-
                                                 
41 Along similar lines, the lorry driver who was driving safely and with care may well feel tremendous guilt for 
hitting the child who suddenly runs in front of the lorry, even though he has not committed a culpable wrong 
(Williams 1981) and may judge his guilt unfitting. See also Williams (1993). 
42 It also helps distinguish guilt from shame. Shame is associated with self-focused thoughts and attentional 
patterns, and tends to motivate withdrawal behaviors like hiding and avoiding others (Tangney et al. 2007). 
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tendencies have a distinctively moral flavor: punishment and forgiveness-seeking, apologies, and 
attempts to make up for harm caused to others are all elements central to our moral practices.    
Tangney et al. (2007: 350) describe the action tendencies promoted by guilt as 
“constructive” and “proactive,” in the sense that guilt motivates people to take actions aimed at 
repairing relationships that may have been harmed by the negative behavior. Thus, guilt aims at 
repairing relationships that have been damaged by the wrongdoer’s harmful conduct, and we 
should think of the various action tendencies characteristic of guilt as attempts to satisfy that goal.  
If the foregoing claims about guilt’s characteristic aim are right, we should expect that 
guilt’s distinctive aim is satisfied when the guilty party feels as if they have properly made up for 
the wrong they caused, and has received assurances from the victim to that effect. In line with this 
suggestion, research suggests that the victim’s acceptance of the wrongdoer’s apology leads to 
guilt-reduction (Prinz 2009; Baumeister et al. 1994). These points explain why survivor guilt, or 
guilt over a harm done to a loved who has since died, can linger, largely unabated, for a long time: 
if the (perceived) victim is gone, direct means to repairing the relationship by offering apologies 
and so on are unavailable, so the goal of guilt remains unsatisfied, and the feeling of guilt persists.43 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I attempted to give a novel, empirically-adequate answer to the question of 
what makes an emotion distinctively moral. Informed and inspired by what I take to be two 
contemporary illuminating yet fatally flawed accounts of the “moral” emotions by Jonathan Haidt 
and Robert Solomon, I introduced a motivational theory of moral emotions, derived from a general 
motivational theory, which defines the moral emotions as those with distinctively moral action 
tendencies and goals. By applying the motivational view to the specific case of guilt, widely agreed 
to count as a moral emotion, I argued that the motivational theory can accommodate key insights, 
suitably adjusted, from Haidt’s and Solomon’s accounts: first, that the action tendencies of 
emotions matter for determining whether they are moral or non-moral, and second, that moral 
emotions involve (though are not constituted by) narrowly moral content. By introducing this 
                                                 
43 This is not to say that guilt won’t fade over time, or couldn’t be ameliorated or extinguished in other ways. 
(Memory-erasure would do the trick, but the extinguishment of an emotion is not the same as proper satisfaction of 
the emotion.) The present point is that reparative actions are the most direct means to satisfying guilt’s goal (Prinz & 
Nichols 2010), and should thus be considered guilt’s distinctive action tendencies.  
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novel account of the moral emotions – to be applied and explored further in the next chapter with 
respect to moral anger – I sought to provide a plausible answer to the ontological question of how 
to vindicate the existence of a distinctively moral emotion in a way that has the resources to 
successfully distinguish the moral emotions from the non-moral emotions while staying true to an 
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Chapter 3 – In Defense of Genuinely Moral Anger 
 
1. Introduction 
Anger is thought by many philosophers to be central to morality. Anger often occurs as a 
response to wrongdoing and seems to play an important role in the blaming and punishing of 
wrongdoers. As such, it’s neither uncommon nor surprising for anger to be referred to as a moral 
emotion, though what precisely is meant by the term “moral anger” is not always clear; does 
generic, garden variety anger, which is likely familiar to us from computer malfunctions or heavy 
traffic, also show up in the moral domain, perhaps as a morally appropriate, fitting, or epistemically 
reliable response to (certain features of) wrongdoing?44 Or is there a distinctive psychological state 
of moral anger that is differentiable from generic anger, and from other emotion types? The latter, 
ontological question is the target of this chapter. In what follows, I use the motivational theory of 
moral emotions I introduced in Chapter 2 to defend the claim that there is a distinctively moral 
subtype of anger. My overarching goal in this chapter is to offer a novel, empirically-supported 
account of moral anger that constitutes a positive answer to the ontological question about moral 
anger, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to vindicate the existence of a genuinely moral 
emotion while making sense of the idea that the moral emotions should be understood as a 
recognizable subset within the general class of the emotions.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I motivate the claim that there is a 
distinctively moral kind of anger that is differentiable from generic anger, which typically takes 
non-moral objects and is characterized by action tendencies that aim to overcome goal-frustration. 
In section 3, I develop my motivational account of moral anger more fully. I argue that moral anger 
counts as distinctively moral primarily in virtue of its action tendencies, which are typically 
triggered by perceived injustice against oneself or others and aim to satisfy two moral goals or 
aims: a communicative goal, and a retributive goal. In developing my account, I draw from recent 
                                                 
44 These distinctions between the various senses of “moral” as applied to anger should be familiar from my longer 
treatment of these issues in Chapter 1 with respect to “moral” disgust.  
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work by David Shoemaker (2015; 2018), who advances an illuminating account of moral anger, 
which he labels blaming anger. Shoemaker claims that the defining aim of blaming anger is 
communicative. He argues that any sanctioning or retaliatory action tendencies that are part of 
blaming anger are merely instrumental to what he considers its fundamental communicative aim. 
I argue that Shoemaker’s account of moral anger is incomplete, because it does not adequately 
explain cases in which moral anger is partially satisfied despite its communicative aim not being 
met. My account of moral anger, which includes a retributive aim that can come apart from the 
communicative aim, is able to explain these cases, and thus extends Shoemaker’s account in an 
important way.  
 
2. Why think there are two kinds of anger? 
In this section, I attempt to motivate the claim that there are two distinct kinds of anger: 
generic anger, and moral anger. I do this in two ways. First, I provide various snippets of views 
found in the philosophical literature that are predicated on the (mostly unargued-for) assumption 
that there is a special moral subtype of anger that is distinct from generic anger. Second, I examine 
empirical evidence regarding anger’s psychological profile. It will be seen that the evidence 
supports the idea that there are two kinds of anger that are distinguishable from each other on the 
basis of their respective aims, action tendencies, appraisals, and characteristic elicitors. 
It is quite common for philosophers to distinguish between the everyday variety of anger 
we’re all familiar with (what I call generic anger) and moral anger. In so doing, it seems that many 
such theorists are implicitly assuming, though not explicitly defending, the existence of a new 
emotion kind that is a distinctively moral subtype of anger. For example, Victor Kumar writes, 
“[m]oral emotions are distinctive in the sense that they differ from various non-moral counterparts, 
e.g. in the way resentment differs from anger” (Kumar 2016: 789). This differentiation between 
generic anger and resentment is particularly prevalent in the contemporary moral responsibility 
literature, thanks primarily to P. F. Strawson’s seminal paper, “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). 
In that paper, Strawson introduced a special class of emotions45 called the “reactive attitudes.” The 
                                                 
45 Gary Watson (1996), for example, describes the reactive attitudes as reactive emotions and considers both 
resentment and indignation among the class of the reactive emotions. Antony Aumann & Zac Cogley describe 
reactive attitudes as “emotional responses to interpersonal situations” and also take anger, understood as something 
narrower than generic attitude, to count as a reactive emotion (n.d.: 1).  
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“reactive attitudes” approach, which has been taken up by R. Jay Wallace (1994) and, more 
recently, by David Shoemaker (2015; 2018), seeks to account for the crucial role blame plays in 
our moral responsibility practices by understanding blame as an essentially emotional response.  
The two most widely-discussed negative reactive attitudes are resentment and moral 
indignation. These are typically understood as kinds of moral anger (see e.g. McKenna 2013; 
Pereboom 2013; Pereboom 2014; Shoemaker 2018; Scanlon 2013). Resentment is typically 
understood as the moral anger someone feels when they have been personally wronged by the 
perpetrator. Derk Pereboom expresses this view when he describes resentment as “anger with an 
agent due to a wrong he has done to oneself” (2014: 179). By contrast, indignation is the moral 
anger elicited in response to a wrong done to someone else (Shoemaker 2015; 2018; McKenna 
2012). In both cases, the anger is directed at the perpetrator. David Shoemaker observes that 
Pereboom, along with most responsibility theorists, takes resentment (and indignation) to 
incorporate a constitutive judgment that what the offender did wronged the resenter (or a third 
party) and/or that the offender deserves blame or is responsible for having perpetrated the wrong 
(Shoemaker 2015). This is a cognitivist analysis, on which resentment and indignation are defined 
by a constitutive judgment about the moral responsibility, wrongdoing, and/or blameworthiness of 
the perpetrator. According to this account of resentment and indignation, we can think of these 
two emotional states as “cognitively sharpened” forms of anger (D’Arms & Jacobson 2003: 143); 
that is, they belong in the same emotion family as generic anger, but are plausibly differentiated 
from it in virtue of their (partially) constitutive judgments. Resentment is constituted by a judgment 
like, “You wronged me [and you’re blameworthy]!” and indignation’s defining judgment is, 
roughly, “You wronged him/her/them!” (Shoemaker 2018: 69-70). 
As I argued at length in Chapter 2, the cognitivist method for type-identifying emotions 
faces a number of problems, especially when used in an effort to define the specifically moral 
emotions. I argued that moral emotions can centrally involve moral content (including narrowly 
moral notions such as wrongness, blameworthiness, moral responsibility, unfairness, etc.) by way 
of their appraisal component, without necessarily being constituted by moral judgments containing 
moral concepts or principles. If this is right, then tokens of genuinely moral anger need not be 
constituted by moral judgments. This means that, on the view of moral anger I endorse, not all 
tokens of the moral anger emotion-type are tokens of resentment or indignation, understood as 
cognitively sharpened forms of anger.  
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To lend support to the claim that appraisals of wrongness need not contain a constitutive 
normative judgment, David Shoemaker offers a compelling analogy between instances of blaming 
anger and aesthetic responses: 
Suppose you are moved to tears on first hearing a live symphony play Samuel 
Barber’s Adagio for Strings. This response arises in you unexpectedly as you hear 
the mournful chord progressions and perceive the interplay of violins and viola. It’s 
not as if your response is constituted by a judgement that this is beautiful: in fact, 
making the judgment that this is beautiful would take you out of that aesthetic 
experience. Sure, your emotional response may count as the source of a later 
independent judgment that the piece was beautiful, but it seems a mistake to say 
that the judgment of beauty is constitutive of that aesthetic response at that time 
(Shoemaker 2018: 71). 
Shoemaker claims that, just as this aesthetic experience is not constituted by a judgment (of 
beauty), being in a state of blaming anger does not seem to require a judgment about wronging or 
responsibility. This insight explains the sudden, irruptive nature of the anger one might feel when 
being shoved in a crowd or realizing that a snide remark was intended as a personal insult (71).  
To spell the point out further, Shoemaker gives the following “more dramatic” example: 
Suppose in seeing your daughter’s black eye you immediately realize that she was 
beaten up by her boyfriend. Your (presumed) angry response will likely come upon 
you immediately, arising independently of any judgments about whether he’s 
responsible or blameworthy for wronging her (Shoemaker 2018: 70). 
I agree with Shoemaker that angry flashes like these count as genuine instances of blaming anger; 
indeed, Shoemaker holds that they are “just as much blaming responses as those angry responses 
[like resentment or indignation] that incorporate some judgment about having been wronged” (70). 
As such, we should – in line with my recommendations in the previous chapter – reject a cognitivist 
account of moral anger and instead opt for a motivational view that can explain the moral content 
associated with moral anger by way of its characteristic appraisal.  
At it turns out, not everyone who discusses “moral anger” has a cognitivist theory of 
emotion in mind. More simply, some theorists seek to differentiate moral anger from generic anger 
according to the kinds of objects each type of anger typically takes. For example, Myisha Cherry 
claims that “moral anger arises out of a moral wrong whereas [non-moral] anger can arise without 
the presence of any “moral” injustice at all” (Cherry m.s.: 1). Similarly, C. Daniel Batson says 
“moral anger is anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard (principle, ideal) has been 
or will be violated” (Batson 2016: 156). For both Cherry and Batson, moral anger is elicited by 
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moral objects, i.e. cases of (perceived) injustice. Moral anger is thus distinguished from non-moral 
(generic) anger, which is elicited by non-moral objects. 
As Antony Aumann & Zac Cogley observe (n.d.) it is less common for psychologists to 
use the term “moral anger,” preferring to stick with just “anger.”46 Without the assumed distinction 
between moral anger and a broader, non-moral kind of anger, we find ourselves with an expansive 
emotion type that is elicited by all kinds of non-moral objects as well as moral objects such as 
perceived injustice. For example, Haidt (2003) claims that anger’s typical elicitors are goal 
blockage and frustration, as well as slights or insults47 that are taken to be unjustified, which 
includes perceived moral norm violations. In a similar vein, Tangney et al. write in their review 
article about moral emotions that “people may experience anger for a very broad range of situations 
– e.g., when insulted, frustrated, inconvenienced, or injured” (2007: 356). Tangney et al. (2007) 
take most appraisal theorists (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1994; Smith & Ellsworth 1985) to hold 
that anger is elicited when people appraise an event (i.e. the object) as personally-relevant, goal-
frustrating, and in some way caused, often intentionally so, by a responsible other. This approach 
suggests that anger and its characteristic appraisal has all the anger-elicitors, non-moral and moral 
alike, covered. So too does anger’s characteristic action tendencies, which include aggressive, 
retaliatory behaviors as well as actions aimed at overcoming goal-frustration (Prinz & Nichols 
2010). If this broad understanding of anger is right, there seems to be no need to posit the existence 
of a distinctively moral subtype of anger, as I plan to do. 
   I think, though, that we have good reason to resist this approach, and insist on drawing a 
distinction between generic anger and non-moral anger, which is a move also made by David 
Shoemaker (2018). To assume that there’s just one, broad kind of anger that is elicited by so many 
different objects is to assume that these wildly varied anger tokens can be sufficiently unified by 
anger’s characteristic appraisal, action tendencies, and goal(s). And I don’t think that’s plausible: 
an emotion that has such disparate eliciting conditions seems like it would be an odd sort of 
emotion. In what follows, I argue against the idea that there’s only one, broad kind of anger and 
instead make the case that there are two kinds of anger: generic anger, and moral anger. It should 
                                                 
46 Aumann & Cogley also note, to echo a point I made above, that “philosophers almost always call the relevant 
emotion ‘resentment’ or ‘indignation’” (n.d.: 1, n5). The emotion they have in mind is the anger involved in blame 
that can be overcome by forgiveness.   
47 Haidt is by no means alone in taking anger to be elicited by slights, offenses, and insults. See e.g. Lazarus (1991), 
D’Arms & Jacobson (2014) and Shoemaker (2015).  
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be noted that throughout this chapter, I proceed on the assumption that the theory of emotions I 
developed in chapter 2 is broadly correct, and that we ought to type-identify emotions primarily 
according to their characteristic action tendencies and goals. In line with the weaker, syndrome 
view, we may also attend to the nature of emotions’ elicitors, and the characteristic thoughts 
associated with emotions’ appraisals. 
As we’ve already seen, psychological research tells us that anger is elicited by a wide range 
of elicitors, a salient subset of which involve perceived injustice.48 To look more closely at the 
range of objects that elicit anger, let’s look to one of the first, and largest-scale, studies on anger. 
Hall (1898) collected detailed reports from over 2000 participants, including children and adults, 
about things that made them angry. There were numerous references to anger elicited by injustice, 
with participants naming elicitors such as “injustice,” “injustice to others,” being “accused of doing 
what I did not do,” and “self-gratification at another’s expense, cruelty, being deceived.” There 
were also many references to anger elicitors that did not obviously have anything to do with 
perceived injustice, such as “girls talking out loud and distracting me in study hours,” “an over 
tidy relative always slicking up my thing,” being “given a seat in church behind a large pillar,” 
“being kept waiting, being hurried, having my skirt trodden on, density in others,” “if I am hurrying 
in the street and others saunter, so that I cannot get by,” and “slovenly work, want of system, 
method and organization” (Hall 1898: 538-539, discussed in Prinz & Nichols 2010: 129).   
Impressed by the rich variety of anger elicitors reported by the participants in Hall’s study, and 
wanting to capture the fact that not all episodes of anger are elicited by perceived injustice, Prinz 
& Nichols (2010) suggest all of these anger elicitors, from being slowed down on the street by 
saunterers to being a victim of cruelty or deception, can be unified and understood as violations of 
the individual’s autonomy, with instances of perceived injustice being the paradigm of such 
violations.49 They write,  
Being annoying or disruptive, thwarting goals, violating personal possessions of 
space, being insulting or offensive – all these things have a negative impact on a 
victim, and thus fail to respect individual rights or autonomy (Prinz & Nichols 
2010: 129-130).  
                                                 
48 See Prinz & Nichols (2010: 128-130) for a useful discussion of the empirical strategy employed in many of these 
studies, and how it likely leads to an overrepresentation of injustice-induced anger episodes. 
49 Cf. Rozin et al. (1999), who also claim that anger is characteristically elicited by violations of autonomy norms, 
but do not seem to construe violations of autonomy as broadly as Prinz & Nichols. 
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Further, they claim, 
That anger is frequently triggered by [objects] other than perceived injustice should 
not be surprising if, as seems likely, the anger system is evolutionarily ancient… In 
older phyla, the homologues of anger may be more typically elicited by physical 
attacks… or the taking of resources (129). 
Prinz & Nichols think that the anger system in humans should reflect its evolutionary history and 
make sense of Darwin’s proposal that anger’s adaptive function is to motivate retaliation (Darwin 
1872, discussed in Prinz & Nichols 2010: 124). So, on this expansive view of anger, anger’s 
characteristic appraisal is about violations of rights or autonomy, and its action-tendencies aim at 
the goal of retaliation in light of such violations. If we include the insights from appraisal theorists 
considered earlier, a move which is consistent with Prinz & Nichol’s explicit attempt to give a 
unified account of anger, we might add that anger includes action tendencies that aim at 
overcoming goal-frustration in addition to its retaliatory action tendencies.  
To say that these features are characteristic of all instances of anger, which is in essence 
what proponents of the expansive view of anger are committed to, strikes me as something of a 
stretch. To return to an example from Hall’s study about typical anger elicitors, being kept waiting 
can certainly be angersome, but many aggravating situations that involve waiting, such as being 
in the doctor’s office, are not plausibly construed as violations of autonomy. Most of us know that 
medical appointments often run behind schedule, and as frustrating as it is to have one’s plans for 
the rest of the day messed up, we don’t tend to appraise these annoying delays as interfering with 
our autonomy, nor do we harbor a genuine retaliatory desire to get back at the medical office’s 
staff or take them to have intentionally kept us waiting. Consider, too, other common elicitors of 
anger, such as bad weather (hello, Michigan winters) that makes one’s commute much more 
difficult, or a computer application that freezes at an especially inconvenient time. Though I might 
like to think I have a right to a fast, easy bike ride to campus, no matter the time of year, or to a 
glitch-free computer experience, it seems less plausible to think of poor weather or malfunctioning 
software as having violated my autonomy than to conceive of them just as instances of goal 
frustration. Admittedly, it is conceivable that I may be motivated to retaliate against my computer, 
insofar as I am appraising it as an agent that intentionally caused the software to crash, thereby 
screwing up my work day – it’s not crazy to think that I might direct a few choice swear words at 
the laptop, or feel an urge to break it – but even if I grant this much in the computer case, I’m 
doubtful the same analysis can be applied to the bad weather case.  
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To lend further support to this last point, David Shoemaker (2018) rightly notes that while 
action tendencies that aim at overcoming goal frustration and action tendencies that aim at 
retaliation sometimes overlap, as suggested above with the computer case, there are pure cases in 
which only one kind of action tendency is operative. Shoemaker imagines a case where a rockslide 
blocks his way to work. The anger he feels when he sees the rockslide “will not result in any sort 
of motivation to retaliate against the rockslide!” Instead, he “will be motivated to look for a way 
around or through the rockslide, so that [he] can still get to work” (Shoemaker 2018: 73).  
If these thoughts are right, then I think we should reject Prinz & Nichols’ suggestion that 
there is one kind of anger, unified by an appraisal that one’s rights or autonomy have been violated, 
that takes such a wide variety of objects in virtue of its disparate eliciting conditions. Instead, I 
think it’s more straightforward, and empirically plausible, to think that cases of generic anger are 
typically elicited by goal frustration, whereas instances of (seemingly, still to be vindicated) moral 
anger are elicited by perceived injustice. Additionally, and relatedly, I suggest we should think of 
generic anger as having the sole aim of overcoming the goal-blocking obstacle, and consider 
action-tendencies that aim at retaliation distinctive of moral anger.  
I am now in a position to properly spell out what I take generic anger to be. On my picture, 
generic anger is a syndrome of appraisal, feeling, and motivation that aims at overcoming goal 
frustration and obstruction. Generic anger appraises its objects as instances of goal-frustration, 
where the goal is personally relevant to the subject, and its action tendencies aim to fulfill its 
characteristic goal by removing or getting around the obstruction. This fits with Frijda’s (1986; 
2007) view of anger, according to which the action tendencies associated with generic anger aim 
to regain control or freedom of action, usually by removing whatever obstacle is restricting one’s 
freedom or control. Someone in the grip of generic anger will experience feelings of heat (e.g. 
higher skin temperature and heart rate), and an urgent desire to be rid of the obstacle. Angry 
feelings, thoughts, and action tendencies are irruptive and will seek precedence over and control 
one’s attention and behavior. The motivational theory predicts that in cases where the obstacle 
can’t be removed – it’s unfortunately quite difficult to get rid of a blizzard or a MacBook’s pesky 
spinning rainbow wheel – the experience of anger will persist, because generic anger’s goal has 
not been satisfied. 
To see the motivational analysis of generic anger in action, imagine that I have recently 
planted some tomato plants in my backyard. I’ve become very invested in seeing them thrive, and 
 63 
am very much looking forward to reaping the fruits (so to speak) of my gardening labor. 
Unfortunately, a squirrel lives nearby who has taken to eating all the tomatoes. One day, I glance 
out at my backyard and see the squirrel nestled among my tomato plants, chomping away. My 
attention is immediately diverted from what I was doing as it comes upon me that the squirrel is 
yet again thwarting my tomato goals. I run outside, shouting expletives at the squirrel, stomping 
loudly, and waving my fists. These tactics successfully scare the squirrel away and, reassured that 
my tomato plants are (temporarily) safe, my anger subsides, at least until the squirrel’s next tomato 
mission. 
On the motivational picture, a constitutive judgment about goal-frustration is not required 
for someone to experience generic anger. In the example given above, I never formed a judgment 
about the squirrel frustrating my goals – but I nevertheless appraised the situation in a way that 
captured these key elements. The motivational theory thus accommodates a datum cognitivist 
theories of emotion struggle with: that pre-verbal infants (and some animals) are just as capable of 
experiencing genuine bouts of generic anger (and other emotions) as adults, despite not yet 
possessing the relevant concepts or being able to form thoughts with reportable, relevant 
propositional content, as long as they are capable of making goal-frustration appraisals (see e.g. 
Deigh 1994 and Griffiths 1997 for a general formulation of this objection to cognitivism). It seems 
quite clear that babies experience real anger, and that their experiences of anger involve the 
perception that they have in some way been prevented from getting what they want, be it “food, 
drink, attention from mommy” (Shoemaker 2018: 72).  
With this picture of generic anger in mind, I now want to briefly sketch my view of moral 
anger, which I will develop more fully in the next section. As suggested above, I take moral anger 
to be characterized by an appraisal of perceived injustice. Thus, moral anger’s paradigm elicitors 
include moral violations perpetrated against oneself or others. These violations are, unsurprisingly, 
usually appraised as wrong, but may be more specifically appraised as wrong in virtue of being 
unfair (Mikula 1986; Scherer 1997), demeaning or offensive (Lazarus 1991), and/or blameworthy 
(Ortony & Turner, 1990). Since I take moral anger to belong to the same emotion family as generic 
anger – i.e. it is a genuine form of anger – we should expect moral anger to resemble generic anger 
when it comes to some of its characteristic features, such as its facial expression, which typically 
includes a furrowed brow, raised eyelids, and thin lips and/or clenched teeth (Ekman & Friesen 
1971), a propensity to shout, and feelings of heat and aggression. Importantly, however, the action 
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tendencies and goals that define moral anger, on my view, go beyond mere obstacle-removal and 
are best thought of as distinctively moral in character. As I hope to establish in the next section, 
moral anger’s action tendencies and goals are the most helpful element of the emotional syndrome 
that help set moral anger apart from generic anger and justify my positing its existence as a 
distinctive emotion type.  
 
3. What are the distinctive aims of moral anger? 
In this section, I develop my account of moral anger in more detail. I contend that moral 
anger is primarily defined by two distinctively moral aims: a sanctioning goal, and a 
communicative goal. First, though, I will first lay out some findings regarding moral anger’s action 
tendencies. As several emotion theorists have pointed out (e.g. Frijda 1986; 2007; Deonna & 
Scherer 2010; Frijda & Scherer 2009), an effective strategy for identifying an emotion’s distinctive 
aim(s) is to examine the various actions the emotion motivates, and consider what goal (goals) 
unifies (unify) the various, possibly disparate actions. 
First, moral anger elicited by perceived moral violations in economic games, such as low 
ball offers in ultimatum games and free-riding in public goods games, motivates both victims and 
third-party bystanders to take action to punish the wrongdoer, despite incurring material costs to 
do so (see e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher 2004; Fehr & Gachter 2002; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Pillutla 
& Murnighan 1996; Tangney et al. 2007; Haidt 2003; Prinz & Nichols 2010). Participants who 
choose to punish perpetrators describe their punitive actions as expressions of anger (Pillutla & 
Murnighan 1996; Fehr & Gachter 2002). Participants also choose to punish even if they know they 
will have no further interactions with the wrongdoer, which, coupled with the fact that they must 
give up some of their own money in order to punish, suggests that the motive for punishing can’t 
be explained by the expectation that punishing will lead to future economic benefit in the game 
(Fehr & Gachter 2002). Punishing behavior in economic games thus cannot be understood as 
motivated by self-interest.50 Rather, is typically interpreted as a form of retaliation aimed at 
                                                 
50 Robert Frank (1988) argues that anger, which he considers a moral emotion that brings with it a “sense of justice” 
(54), is best understood as an evolved commitment device. Commitment devices enable people to pursue a more 
rewarding long-term strategy of cooperation by acting in a costly (to one’s self-interest) way in the short term. This 
explains why people choose to punish wrongdoing in economic games, despite incurring material costs in doing so.  
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remedying perceived injustice by getting even (Tangney et al. 2007; Haidt 2003; Prinz & Nichols 
2010; D’Arms & Jacobson 2014; Gibbard 1990).  
The idea that retaliation is a key action tendency of anger is famously found in Aristotle. 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes,  
Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous 
revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what 
concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends. If this is a proper 
definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual 
(Rhetoric 1378a-b, 70-71). 
Though Aristotle does not explicitly call the emotion he has in mind “moral,” insofar as he is 
concerned with explaining what role the emotions play for a properly virtuous person, I think it’s 
reasonable to interpret him as having a conception of anger in mind that is narrower than a broad 
view of anger that’s also intended to capture goal-blockage.     
There are, however, competing interpretations of the data regarding the punishing behavior 
seen in economic games that go beyond an aim of retribution. For example, Brendan Dill & 
Stephen Darwall (2014) argue that the moral emotions of guilt and blame (what I’m calling moral 
anger) serve the central moral motives of condemnation and conscience. The core motivation of 
moral anger, which is elicited by an appraisal of wrongdoing and directed at the wrongdoer, is 
condemnation, which aims to get wrongdoers to hold themselves to account for their wrongdoing. 
Guilt’s core moral motive is conscience, which is elicited by one’s own wrongdoing, which 
functions to hold oneself to account. Dill & Darwall argue that their account is better supported by 
the empirical data than a rival, purely retributive hypothesis, which holds that the moral emotions, 
particularly moral anger functions only to make wrongdoers suffer.  
I agree with Dill & Darwall that moral anger doesn’t aim solely at retribution. In addition 
to moral anger’s retributive aim, I hold that moral anger is also characterized by a communicative 
aim, and that this element of my view can be made consistent with Dill & Darwall’s accountability 
aim(s). I suggest that some (but, as I will try to make clear below, not all) of moral anger’s 
characteristic action tendencies, which may include obvious communicative and expressive acts 
like yelling or physically lashing out, should be understood as communicative attempts to hold the 
wrongdoer to account. If communication is successful and there is uptake of the condemnatory 
message, guilt will likely be elicited in the wrongdoer (Aumann & Cogley n.d.; cf. Macnamara 
2015; Gibbard 1990). A wrongdoer in the grip of guilt will, as I argued in the preceding chapter, 
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recognize that they are responsible for having wronged the victim and engage in reparative actions, 
aimed at repairing the relationship that’s been damaged by the wrong. In so doing, they are holding 
themselves to account. Once the victim sees this, the communicative aim of moral anger, and moral 
anger itself, will presumably be satisfied, which can in turn allow the wrongdoer’s guilt to subside.  
 
3.1 The communicative goal of moral anger 
David Shoemaker (2015; 2018) has recently advanced a compelling account of moral anger 
(what he calls “blaming anger,” or, equivalently, “angry blame”). Shoemaker, who, like me, makes 
use of a motivational theory of emotion (following Frijda 1986; 2007 and Scarantino 2014) argues 
that the fundamental, encompassing aim of angry blame is communicative (Shoemaker 2018). 
Unlike me, Shoemaker argues that any sanctioning or retaliatory action tendencies that are part of 
angry blame, such as the desire to get back at, lash out at, or punish a wrongdoer, are merely 
instrumental to angry blame’s fundamental communicative aim. In what follows, I try to show that 
Shoemaker’s account of moral anger is incomplete because the retributive goal of moral anger can 
come apart from its communicative aim. I argue that it’s possible for moral anger to be partially 
satisfied even when its communicative aim is not fulfilled, something that my account, but not 
Shoemaker’s, predicts and explains.  
First, however, I will examine Shoemaker’s arguments in favor of the communicative aim, 
which are illuminating and have convinced me that moral anger is partially defined by a goal that 
aims at communication. Shoemaker’s arguments also help make clear why another rival view of 
moral anger – the protest account of blame – is deficient. Shoemaker notes that satisfaction of 
moral anger’s communicative aim is partially achieved just by “getting something off your chest” 
(2015: 104). Being able to give voice to one’s anger as opposed to keeping it bottled up can yield 
great, if not total, relief. Shoemaker takes this as a reason for why we should prefer an account of 
moral anger that includes the communicative aim over the protest account of blame, a rival account 
of angry blame that does not include the communicative function. On the protest account, the 
central purpose of expressing one’s moral anger is to stand up for oneself (see e.g. Smith 2013, 
discussed in Shoemaker 2015), perhaps to restore one’s self-respect or one’s standing relative to 
others after suffering a wrong or a slight. Though the expression of anger may well serve to 
reestablish one’s self-respect, especially in the eyes of other third-party bystanders, it seems as if 
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something important is missing when the anger is not successfully communicated to the perpetrator 
of the slight. Shoemaker brings this point out nicely by asking us to consider two pairwise cases. 
In the first case, the communication of one’s anger to the wrongdoer is achieved, whereas in the 
second, it is not. Shoemaker argues that if the wrongdoer, who is the primary target of the 
expressed moral anger, fails to hear and understand this expression as a protest of the wrong he 
committed, moral anger’s aim is frustrated (2015: 105). Anger which is expressed but not taken 
up by the wrongdoer thus falls short, even when it’s heard by bystanders. As Shoemaker writes, 
moral anger “aspires to be more than just public noise” (105). It essentially involves a 
communicative function which is only fully satisfied when the expression of anger is successfully 
communicated to, and heard by, the wrongdoer.  
Here, it’s worth noting that Shoemaker (2015; 2018) no longer believes (cf. his earlier 
work) that anger’s communicative, expressive tendencies aim to sanction the wrongdoer. He 
denies that retaliation is built into the moral anger felt by victims of wrongdoing. Such victims 
“may, without frustration, merely be motivated to shun, or shoot a dirty look at, the slighter” 
(Shoemaker 2015: 107). To Shoemaker, the fundamental point of these and other actions motivated 
by moral anger is to make the slighter fully aware of what he has done. Moral anger is thus “a 
demand to get him to appreciate, to acknowledge, the emotional havoc (and worse) that he has 
wreaked” (107). To Shoemaker, although an angry demand leveled at a wrongdoer to acknowledge 
what he has done might bring pain to the offender, this pain is just a contingent side-effect of the 
communicative demand. The sanctions brought about by angry actions are not, then, part of moral 
anger’s characteristic aim. Shoemaker says that though it’s true that the retributive motivation of 
moral anger is often associated with its communicative aim, “that’s essentially because retribution 
is perhaps the most effective and dramatic form the communication of anger can take” (2018: 75).  
To support the claim that the fundamental aim of moral anger is communicative, 
Shoemaker cites some empirical findings I myself drew on in Chapter 1.51 To recap: Gollwitzer 
and colleagues (2009; 2011) conducted two studies which sought to clarify what goal is motivating 
punishment behavior in economic games. In both studies, participants played a two-person public 
goods game with an unseen partner. After receiving an unfair offer, some of the participants had 
                                                 
51 Dill & Darwall (2014) also take these findings to support their claims about the core moral motive of 
condemnation aiming at accountability, and the conclusion I drew from the results in Chapter 1 are entirely 
consistent with Dill & Darwall’s interpretation.  
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the opportunity to punish their exploitative partner by signing them up for an unpleasant follow-
up task. One group of participants who did elect to punish then received a message from the 
wrongdoer communicating his understanding that he deserved the punishment he received, while 
other subjects did not receive any such message. When participants were asked how satisfied they 
felt after punishing the wrongdoer, Gollwitzer et al. (2011) found that punishment was satisfying 
for participants if, and only if, it was followed by a message from the perpetrator that showed that 
he was holding himself accountable for his earlier wrongdoing. Notably, participants who got no 
such message from the wrongdoer were dissatisfied; interestingly, they were just as dissatisfied as 
the participants who elected not to punish the wrongdoer at all.  
In Chapter 1, I concluded from these results that what people are seeking when they punish 
people who wrong them is not mere retribution – i.e. people are not content just to have an outlet 
for their anger. I suggested that punishing behavior is best explained as being driven by a desire to 
hold the wrongdoer to account. Importantly, I said that “the functional goal of [moral] anger, which 
is achieved by its distinctive action tendencies, is to redress the perceived injustice that has taken 
place” (see page  21). According to my current, more detailed account of moral anger, moral anger 
will be properly fulfilled when both its communicative and retributive aims are satisfied, and for 
the participants in the study who both meted out punishment and received a satisfying message 
from the wrongdoer, this indeed seems to be the case. The result that nicely confirms Shoemaker’s 
claim and thus spells trouble for my account is the finding that participants who punished yet got 
no message from the wrongdoer were just as dissatisfied as participants who neither punished nor 
(successfully) communicated with the wrongdoer. If I am right in claiming that moral anger has 
two distinct aims, we should expect those who punished to have at least partially satisfied moral 
anger’s retributive aim, and be slightly more satisfied than those who neither punished nor had any 
communication with the offender.  
At this point, I could try to tell a story about how the boring follow up task that was meant 
to serve as the punishment in the study wasn’t sufficiently unpleasant to count as punishment, or 
explain the results away in some other way. I don’t think that would be very fruitful, though, so 
instead I want to raise the possibility that in general, the infliction of suffering (via punishment, 
etc.) aims in part at the goal of retaliation. As Aumann & Cogley (n.d.; see also Cogley 2013) 
observe, the elicitation of guilt is itself a sanction, in virtue of its being unpleasant to feel. When 
shooting a dirty look at or pointedly ignoring your slighter, the point is not just to make clear to 
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them that you’re angry. Such actions often seem designed to hurt in order to get back at the 
wrongdoer for having hurt you (or a third party) in the first place. Punishing behavior certainly 
helps fulfill moral anger’s communicative aim in many cases, but I want to suggest that it also 
aims at a distinctive, retributive goal to get back at the wrongdoer. In the next section, I discuss 
some other results from psychological studies to see if my suggestion has at least some empirical 
support. 
 
3.2 The retributive goal of moral anger  
Haidt and colleagues (2010) ran a study in which they showed clips from Hollywood films 
that portrayed injustice, and then asked participants to rate a variety of alternate endings. (All 
participants reported being very angry in response to the injustices they saw.) I’ll discuss three of 
the ending options that are of particular interest for present purposes. The first kind of ending is 
one in which the victim made the perpetrator suffer in a way that parallels the original wrongdoing; 
for example, one of the movies involved a slave owner who had cut the limb off a slave. By way 
of punishment, the slave owner had one of his limbs severed by the slave. It’s important to note 
that in these endings, the wrongdoer understood that he was being punished by the victim for the 
wrong he committed. The second type of ending also involved the perpetrator suffering in a way 
that paralleled the original wrong, but without the perpetrator knowing that it was the victim who 
inflicted the suffering. The final type of ending did not involve any suffering at all for the 
perpetrator; rather, the victim was depicted as coming to terms with the injustice (e.g. by becoming 
more active in their church community or joining a support group) and learning to forgive the 
perpetrator for the injustice.  
Haidt et al. found that participants were most satisfied by endings that depicted the 
perpetrator being punished by the victim and knowing that their suffering was being inflicted as 
payback for the original injustice. Participants were moderately satisfied by endings in which the 
perpetrator suffered, yet didn’t know they were being punished by the victim. Interestingly, 
participants were not at all satisfied by the endings in which the victim dealt with the injustice on 
their own and learned to forgive the perpetrator. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral 
anger elicited by perceived injustice is fully satisfied when it achieves its retributive aim – the 
infliction of suffering or punishment – and its communicative aim – the perpetrator gets the 
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message that they are being punished for the wrong they committed. Infliction of punishment 
without successful communication was less satisfying, which is consistent with what my account 
of moral anger predicts: even though the communicative aim was not reached, the retributive goal 
was satisfied, so we should expect only partial satisfaction of the moral anger episode.52  
 In addition to the movie ending experiment, Haidt et al. (2010) also asked participants to 
describe satisfying revenge scenarios from their own lives. They write,  
Most of the satisfying revenge scenarios involved some form of immediate 
retaliation, generally verbal. But a few described efforts to retaliate behind the 
scenes. A male who felt insulted by a professor wrote a scathing letter about him, 
which he thinks was instrumental in preventing the professor from obtaining tenure 
(Haidt et al. 2010: 10). 
I take this example to demonstrate that, in some cases, moral anger can be at least partially satisfied 
by knowing that the wrongdoer has suffered, even if the wrongdoer doesn’t know that their 
suffering has been inflicted on them by the victim of the original injustice. The satisfaction of this 
man’s moral anger can’t just be explained in terms of the release that comes from expressing his 
anger and getting it out onto the page. Rather, it makes more sense to interpret the act of writing 
the letter as a means to the retributive goal of making the professor suffer: here, by derailing his 
tenure case. In this case, it seems likely that the man’s moral anger was satisfied only when he 
heard that the professor was, in fact, denied tenure, thereby receiving confirmation that his 
retaliatory efforts had succeeded.   
Finally, let me briefly consider some results from a study conducted by Doob & Wood 
(1976, discussed in Haidt et al. 2010). The study found that victims of injustice who observed their 
“tormentor” being punished were less likely to administer additional pain to the wrongdoer, even 
though they themselves were not the ones actively making the wrongdoer suffer and they had no 
way of communicating with the wrongdoer. I think that we can interpret the victims’ decreasing 
urge to continue to inflict pain on the wrongdoer as evidence that their moral anger has been 
partially satisfied by seeing the wrongdoer punished.  There is no communication in this scenario, 
but there is retribution. The partial satisfaction of moral anger in the absence of communication 
seen here supports my claim that moral anger has a distinctive retributive goal that can come apart 
from its communicative aim. 
                                                 
52 Unfortunately, the study did not include a class of endings that depicted communication without retaliation.  
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With these considerations in mind, I think that we should accept that my account of moral 
anger builds on Shoemaker’s view in an important way. I have tried to establish that Shoemaker’s 
account of moral anger, which considers moral anger’s retaliatory action tendencies as merely 
instrumental to its fundamental communicative aim, cannot adequately explain cases in which 
moral anger is partially satisfied despite its communicative aim not being met, and is thus 
incomplete. By contrast, my account of moral anger, which includes a retributive aim that can 
come apart from the communicative aim, is better able to predict and explain these cases.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I defended a novel, motivational theory of genuinely moral anger. Drawing 
from the motivational theory of moral emotions I developed in Chapter 2 and building on David 
Shoemaker’s insightful account of angry blame, I argued that there is a distinctively moral kind of 
anger that is differentiable from generic anger. I claimed that moral anger counts as distinctively 
moral in virtue of its action tendencies, which are typically triggered by perceived injustice against 
oneself or others, and aim to satisfy two moral aims: a communicative goal, and a retributive goal.  
I argued that my motivational theory is preferable to a cognitivist account because it can 
make sense of moral anger’s moral content without committing to the claim that instances of moral 
anger are necessarily (partially) constituted by moral judgments. If my account of moral anger is 
right, then not all tokens of distinctively moral anger are tokens of resentment and indignation, 
where these emotions are understood as partially constituted by a judgment about wrongness, 
blame, or responsibility. This insight has important implications for ongoing debates in the moral 
responsibility literature, in which a cognitivist analysis of resentment and indignation is mostly 
assumed.  
A potential objection that must be acknowledged is whether I have done enough to 
establish the conclusion that there are two distinct kinds of anger. What I have tried to do in this 
chapter is show that the empirical evidence from the psychological literature and Shoemaker’s 
(2018) proposed bifurcated view of anger dovetail to support my claim that there is a distinction 
in psychological kinds of anger worth making. If the distinction I have attempted to draw between 
moral anger and non-moral anger does not hold, then I would need to find another way to support 
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my claim that there is a distinctively moral kind of anger without reverting to a cognitivist approach 
and claiming that moral anger is partially constituted by a narrowly moral judgment of some kind. 
One reason in favor of my claim that there are two kinds of anger, moral anger and generic 
anger, is that it presents a promising solution to a widespread problem in both the psychological 
and philosophical literatures. The problem is that the accounts of anger offered by moral 
psychologists about how anger appraises its object and what the goal of anger is do not fit together 
neatly enough to solve the following puzzle: how to make sense of the motivation to retaliate or 
punish that seems central to some instances of anger, while also explaining why there seem to be 
paradigm cases of anger that are not about perceived injustices or slights – the sort of things to 
elicit retaliatory or punishing action tendencies – so much as they are about goal frustration, which 
do not seem to involve the same kinds of action tendencies. It is difficult to see what goal 
frustration and perceived injustice have in common, other than the fact that we seem to get angry 
both when we take ourselves to have been wronged and when our goals have been frustrated. My 
proposal – i.e. that we should posit the existence of a distinctively moral kind of anger that captures 
the instances of anger elicited by perceived slights and offenses that seems central to our moral 
psychology and practices that is, importantly, distinct from generic anger, which explains the 
instances of anger elicited by goal frustration – is an empirically-informed attempt to address this 
problem without adopting a broad account of anger that must unite such a disparate set of eliciting 
conditions, appraising thoughts, and action tendencies.   
The overarching goal of this chapter, which brings together key aims of the dissertation 
project as a whole, was to offer a novel, empirically-supported account of moral anger that 
constitutes a positive answer to the ontological question about moral anger. It is my hope that I 
have done enough to show that it is possible to vindicate the existence of a genuinely moral 
emotion – specifically, moral anger – while staying true to the important idea that the moral 
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